United States Court of Appeals
for the
District of Columbia Circuit
TRANSCRIPT OF
RECORD
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
APEIL TEEM, 1933
No. 6025
MARGARET ANDREWS BELMONT, APPELLANT,
WALTER S. ANDREWS REGINALD S. HUIDE-
KOPER, MORGAN BELMONT, TRUSTEES, AND
MURIEL ABBOTT ANDREWS, EXECUTRIX
UNDER THE WILL OF PAUL A. ANDREWS, DE¬
CEASED, APPELLEES.
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA.
INDEX
Original Print
Caption . a 1
Petition . 1 2
Decree . 20 16
Petition and report of trustees. 25 19
Decree approving account of trustees. 35 27
Supplemental petition of trustees for instructions. 36 28
Exhibit “A”. 44 35
Answer and return of Margaret Andrews Belmont. 45 35
Last will of Frank W. Andrews. 48 38
Memorandum of court. 55 43
Petition of Muriel Abbott Andrews for a rehearing. 56 44
Memorandum in support of petition for a rehearing.... 56 44
Answer of Walter S. Andrews et al., trustees, to petition
for rehearing. 60 47
Answer of Margaret Andrews Belmont to petition for re¬
hearing . 61 47
Memorandum opposing petition for rehearing. 61 48
Opinion of Justice O. R. Luhring. 62 48
Decree instructing trustees. 69 54
Appeal noted by Margaret Andrews Belmont and under¬
taking for costs on appeal fixed at $100 or a superse¬
deas at $4,000. 71 56
Memorandum: Supersedeas bond ($4,000) on appeal ap¬
proved and filed. 71 56
Assignments of error. 71 56
Designation of record. 73 57
Clerk’s certificate. 75 59
Judd & Detweiler (Inc.), Printers, Washington, D. C., August 28,1933,
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
No. 6025.
|
Margaret Andrews Belmont, Appellant,
v.
Walter S. Andrews, et al.
a Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
Equity. No. 53738.
Walter S. Andrews, Reginald S. Huidekoper, {Morgan
Belmont, Petitioners,
v.
Frank W. Andrews, William T. Andrews, John K. C. An-
drews, Margaret Andrews Belmont, Paul A. Andrews,
and Margaret A. Belmont, Infant, Defendants.
United States of America,
District of Columbia , ss:
Be it remembered, That in the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia, at the City of Washington, in said
District, at the times hereinafter mentioned, the following
papers were filed and proceedings had, in the above-entitled
cause, to-wit:
1—6025a
2 M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
1 In the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
Holding an Equity Court.
Equity. No. 53738.
Walter S. Andrews, Reginald S. Huidekoper, Morgan
Belmont, Petitioners,
v.
Frank W. Andrews, William T. Andrews, John K. C. An-
drews, Margaret Andrews Belmont, Paul A. Andrews,
and Margaret A. Belmont, Infant, Defendants.
Petition
Filed December 1, 1931.
The petition of Walter S. Andrews, Reginald S. Huide¬
koper and Morgan Belmont, respectfully represents to the
Court as follows:
1. That the petitioner Walter S. Andrews is a citizen of
the United States and a resident of Newport, in the State
of Rhode Island, and files this petition in his own right as
devisee and as Trustee under the Will of Frank W. An¬
drews, deceased; that the petitioner Reginald S. Huide¬
koper is a citizen of the United States and a resident of
the District of Columbia and files this petition as Substi¬
tuted Trustee under the said Will pursuant to a decree of
this Honorable Court, entered in Equity Cause No. 31656
on the 16th day of May, 1913, substituting him as Trustee,
vice Oscar Luckett, deceased; that the petitioner Morgan
Belmont is a citizen of the United States and a resi-
2 dent of : the Town of Westbury, Nassau County, in
the State of New York and files this petition as Sub¬
stituted Trustee under the said Will pursuant to a decree
entered in said Equity Cause No. 31656 on the 14th day of
January, 1929, substituting him as Trustee, vice Paul A.
Andrews, resigned. All of which pleadings, proceedings,
orders and decrees are matters of record in the said Equity
Cause No. 31,656, and it is prayed that they may be re¬
ferred to and considered as part of this petition.
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
3
That the petitioners bring this suit, for the reasons here¬
inafter set forth, on behalf of all persons who now have or
may hereafter be entitled to any interest in the Estate of
the said Frank W. Andrews, deceased.
II. That all of the defendants are citizens of the United
States; that the defendant Frank W. Andrews, fcorn in
1902, is a resident of the City of Newport, State of Rhode
Island; that the defendant William T. Andrews, iborn in
1905, is a resident of the City of Newport, State of Rhode
Island; that the defendant John K. C. Andrews, porn in
1909, is a resident of the City of Newport, State of Rhode
Island; that the defendant Margaret Andrews Belmont,
born in 1894, is the same person who was named in the
Original Bill filed in said Equity Cause No. 31656 as Mar¬
garet Frances Andrews, she having intermarried With the
petitioner Morgan Belmont, and is a resident of th^ Town
of Westbury, Nassau County, in the State of New] York;
that the defendant Paul A. Andrews, formerly a resident
of the City of Newport, State of Rhode Island, is npw tem¬
porarily domiciled in the City of Washington, District of
(Columbia; that the defendant Margaret A. Belniont, a
minor of the age of fourteen years, born on jVIay 9,
3 1917, is the only child of the said petitioner Morgan
Belmont and his said wife, the defendant Margaret
Andrews Belmont, and resides with her parents in the town
of Westbury, Nassau County, in the State of New York;
that the petitioner Walter S. Andrews and the defendants
named herein, are respectively the sole living children,
grandchildren and great-grandchildren of the said (Frank
W. Andrews deceased, and as such, the sole living deVisees,
legatees and distributees under the Last Will and testa¬
ment of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, late a resident of
Middleton, in the State of Rhode Island, bearing datb Sep¬
tember 25, 1902, a certified copy whereof was admitted to
probate and record in the District of Columbia, by order
of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia holding
a Probate Court, entered on the 8th day of July, 1903, in
Administration Case No. 11591, as will appear frofn the
original Bill filed in said Equity Cause No. 31656, and the
proceedings thereunder, which are prayed to be re^d as
part of this petition.
4
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
That the said defendants are sued in his, her and their
own right as devisees, legatees and beneficiaries under
the Will of the said Frank W. Andrews, deceased, and as
representing persons of the same respective class, if any,
hereafter born, who may now have, or may hereafter be
entitled to have, any interest in the estate of the said
Frank W. Andrews, deceased, under his said Will.
III. That your petitioner Walter S. Andrews was ap¬
pointed one of the original Trustees under the provisions
of the said Will of the said Frank W. Andrews, deceased,
and is now acting as such; and your petitioners Reginald
S. Huidekoper and Morgan Belmont were Substituted
Trustees under the said Will and are still acting as
4 such, pursuant to the said decrees hereinabove re¬
ferred to, with all the powers and duties as if they
had been originally appointed by and under the provisions
of the said Will.
That as Trustees as aforesaid, your petitioners now hold
title for all persons who may have or who may hereafter
be entitled to any interest, whether legal or equitable, in
the Estate of the said Frank W. Andrews, deceased, under
his Will, and especially fo the following improved real
estate in the District of Columbia:
(1) Lots numbered Three (3) and Four (4) in Mary A.
Derby’s subdivision of Square One Hundred and SMv-two
(162) as per plat recorded in Liber W. B. M. at Folio 401
of the Records of the Surveyor of the District of Columbia,
improved by part of the Grafton Hotel; (2) Lot numbered
Fourteen (14) in Square Two Thousand, Five Hundred
and Seventeen (2517) improved by the Wendell Mansions;
and (3) Lot numbered Nine (9) in Square Two Hundred
and Eighteen (218) improved by the Edmonds Building.
That the said Edmonds Building was purchased by the
then Trustees in July 1923, and title to the said property
was conveyed to the then Trustees under the Will of the
said Frank W. Andrews, deceased, by a deed in trust dated
and recorded July 30, 1923 in Liber 5039 at Folio 201 of
the Land Records of the District of Columbia. That the
said deed in trust recited that the then Trustees under the
Will of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, pursuant to the
powers vested in them by the said Will, had invested the
proceeds of sale of certain real property belonging to the
said Estate in the purchase of the property conveyed to
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
5
them by said deed in trust and herein designated as
5 the Edmonds Building. That by the said deed in
trust title in fee simple was conveyed to the then
Trustees of the Estate of Frank W. Andrews, deceased,
subject to a former deed of trust, dated June 1, }921 and
recorded June 8,1921, in Liber 4561 at Folio 69 of the Land
Records of the District of Columbia, securing the: sum of
$250,000 evidenced by notes of the former owners of the
said property dated June 1, 1921 and due June 1, 1924, all
of which said notes are now held and owned by Itlie said
Trustees.
That in order to pay said prior incumbrance on the said
property, the then Trustees by their deed of trust dated
January 7, 1924, and recorded January 28, 1924 in Liber
5162 at Folio 65 of the Land Records of the District of Co¬
lumbia, secured the sum of $250,000 on the said property
evidenced by their said notes as said Trustees bearing in¬
terest at six per cent, payable January 27, 1929, wliich last
mentioned deed of trust recited i ‘said money being loaned
for the purpose of paying off the (then) present first deed
of trust for Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars”,
which was done.
That by paying off the said prior incumbrance, with
funds derived from their said deed of trust, the said Trus¬
tees became subrogated to all the rights of the holders of
the notes secured by said prior incumbrance of the prop¬
erty at the time it was purchased.
That thereafter the present Trustees extended $25,000
of their said notes to January 27, 1932 and $22^,000 of
their said notes to January 27, 1934, and the same now
the only existing liens upon the said property, and
6 represent the balance of the deferred purchase price
of the said property.
IV. Your petitioners further represent that under the
terms and provisions of the said Will of the said Frank
W. Andrews, deceased, and in accordance with tne said
decrees entered herein on the 16th day of May, 1913, and
on the 14th day of January, 1929, your petitioners, Walter
S. Andrews, Reginald S. Huidekoper and Morgan Belmont
are now vested as Trustees with the fee simple title to the
real estate belonging to the Estate of Frank W. Andrews,
deceased, which is wholly within the District of Columbia,
6
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
in and upon the following trusts, amongst others, as set
forth in the said Will, viz:
“To hold, manage and direct the same during the lives
of my said two sons and the life of the survivor or longest
liver of them, and upon the death of the survivor or longest
liver of my said two sons, my Trustees shall convey in fee
simple, transfer and pay over said trust property as it shall
then exist and free of any trust or condition to my lawful
issue then living, they taking by representation, according
to the stocks; provided, however, that if upon the decease
of the survivor or longest liver of my said two sons, there
shall be no lawful issue of mine then living, my Trustees
shall then convey in fee simple, transfer and pay over said
trust property as it shall then exist, and free of any trust
or condition, to those persons who are at that time my
heirs by blood, and my Trustees shall dispose of the net
rents and income of said trust property arising before the
conveyance just directed, as follows: They shall pay the
said net rents and income during the continuance of this
trust in equal quarterly payments in every year in
7 equal shares to such of my said two sons as may be
living at the time of payment and to the lawful issue
then living of either of my said two sons who has then de¬
ceased (whether such my son have died before or after me)
such issue taking by representation according to the stocks
the share which such my deceased son would have taken if
living. * * *
“Seventh. I hereby authorize and empower the Trus¬
tees or Trustee for the time being under this Will, in their
or his discretion to sell at public auction or private sale,
or lease, any portion or the whole of the estate, real and
personal, which they or he may hold under the trust created
by this will, and to execute and deliver good and sufficient
deeds and other instruments to convey and transfer the
same. And wherever it shall become necessary to make the
final distribution of any property held in trust under this
will, the Trustees or Trustee for the time being shall have
like authority for the purpose of such distribution to sell
and convert into money the whole or any portion of such
property, whether real or personal; and I direct my Trus¬
tees to reinvest the proceeds of any real estate sold, in other
productive real estate.”
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 7
V. Your petitioners further represent that the only two
sons of the said Testator, Frank W. Andrews, deceased, are
(1) the defendant Paul A. Andrews and (2) the petitioner
Walter S. Andrews, each of whom under the terms of their
father’s Will is entitled to receive during his life one-half
of the net income of the said Estate; that the qefendant
Margaret Andrews Belmont is the only child of the said
Paul A. Andrews, and as such has a vested interest in one-
half of the residuum of the said Estate; that the defend¬
ants Frank W. Andrews, William T. Andrews and
8 John K. C. Andrews, who have no issue, are the only
children of the said Walter S. Andrews (now di¬
vorced) and as such have a vested interest equally amongst
themselves, in the other one-half of the residuum oij the said
Estate; that the defendant Margaret A. Belmont, la minor,
as daughter of the defendant Margaret Andrews Belmont,
will be entitled by way of executory devise, to the j share in
the said Estate now vested in her mother in case hep mother
should die before the two sons of the Testator (^ho have
only a life interest in the income) and the interest of the
said minor in the said Estate is now wholly contingent;
and that the above named persons are the only lining per¬
sons having directly, or indirectly, any right, title or in¬
terest in the Estate of the said Frank W. Andrews, de¬
ceased, under his Will.
VI. Your petitioners further represent that though the
power to mortgage or to give deeds of trust is not in ex¬
press terms provided for in the said Will, they are ad¬
vised that such power is by reasonable intendment and im¬
plication, necessarily vested in the Trustees under the
terms of the said Will and should be judicially declared to
be vested in the said Trustees in order to carry out the real
intention of the Testator and to preserve the said Estate
from loss.
Your petitioners are informed, believe and therefore
aver that the said Testator purchased in 1899 two adjoin¬
ing pieces of property on F Street in the City of Wash¬
ington, D. C., and made and executed his deeds or trust
securing his notes dated October 6, 1899, in the sum of
$30,000.00 secured on one parcel, and in the sum of
$40,000.00 secured on the other parcel. These note^, in the
aggregate sum of $70,000.00 the said Testator ex-
9 tended by endorsement so as to become due ^Lpril 6,
1905. The Testator in his Will, dated September 25,
8
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
1902, refers to this indebtedness, when he provided (Para¬
graph V) that his widow (since deceased) out of the in¬
come which she was given for life, should pay “the in¬
terest on all debts secured by any lien upon any of my said
real estate”. The Testator died in May, 1903. After the
death of the said Testator, further extensions of these
notes were accepted by the holders thereof, until they were
finally paid off in 1919 by the Trustees under the said Tes¬
tator’s Will with proceeds of real estate sold. Other funds
derived from the sales of these F Street properties sold by
the said Trustees were used in part payment of the pur¬
chase of the Edmonds Building. Your petitioners are ad¬
vised, believe and therefore aver that if the holders of
these $70,000.00 of notes had refused to extend the same
after this trust became active, the real estate securing these
loans would have been sold to satisfv the indebtedness and
w
lost to the said Estate, unless the said Will were construed
to empower the said Trustees to give a mortgage or deed
of trust to pay or renew the loans made by the Testator.
Your petitioners are advised, believe and therefore aver
that the Testator knew at the time he executed his said
Will, that his Trustees would be confronted with the neces¬
sity of mortgaging or giving deeds of trust securing loans
on the properties vested in them under his Will (unless his
Trustees could induce the holders of the Testator’s notes to
extend them) and the said Testator knew that the Estate
could not be otherwise managed and controlled by his said
Trustees without their having the power to mortgage or
give deeds of trust so as to preserve the said Estate,
10 and he fully intended by his said Will that his said
Trustees should be vested with such powers.
Your petitioners are advised, believe and therefore aver
that the provisions of the said Testator’s Will that the
Trustees shall “hold, manage and direct” the property
vested in them, with discretion to sell * * * or lease any
portion or the whole of the Estate” * * * and “to re¬
invest the proceeds of any real estate sold, in other produc¬
tive real estate”, must be read in connection with the fact
that the Testator left his property incumbered, and thereby
imposed the duty on his Trustees of refinancing the prop¬
erty by mortgage or deed of trust, in order to “hold, man¬
age and direct” the same and to preserve it for the uses
set out in the said Will.
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 9
VII. Your petitioners further represent that pursuant
to the powers and discretion vested in the Trustees by the
terms of the said Will, the said Trustees have, oti several
occasions sold real estate and reinvested the proceeds in
other real estate in this District as required by t}he terms
of the said Will. But the said Trustees have been unable
at the time of making a sale to obtain “other productive
real estate’’ of equal market value as the property sold.
It is quite impossible to sell one piece of real estate and
reinvest the proceeds in another piece without Either re¬
ceiving a small amount of cash, which is too smkll to in¬
vest in “other productive real estate”, or assuming a deed
of trust securing the balance of the unpaid purchase money
on the property purchased.
Your petitioners further represent that when jthe then
Trustees purchased the Edmonds Building, as set forth in
the third paragraph of this petition, they were advised by
a local Title Company that in its opinion jthe said
11 Trustees had the power under the said WilJ to pur¬
chase the said property subject to deeds of trust se¬
curing the balance of the purchase price, and the sdid Trus¬
tees had the power to encumber by mortgage or deed of
trust in continuation or renewal of the purchase money
trusts, or prior existing encumbrances.
Your petitioners further represent that pursuant thereto
the then Trustees executed their deed of trust dated Janu¬
ary 7, 1924 (referred to in the third paragraph of this
petition), secured on the Edmonds Building, whicq recited
that “said money being loaned for the purpose of paying
off the (then) present first deed of trust for Two Hundred
and Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000) on the property
hereinbefore described, as provided in said deed of trust”.
After executing the said deed of trust dated January 7,
1924 refinancing the said $250,000 prior existing frust on
the Edmonds Building, the said Title Company issued to
the then Trustees its certificate of title dated January 30,
1924, certifying that the lien created by the said deed of
trust was a lien upon the said property.
VIII. Your petitioners are advised, believe and therefore
aver that such construction of the said Will of F|ank W.
Andrews, deceased, is in accord with the trend of authorita¬
tive decisions construing similar Wills not containing in
express words the power to mortgage, and is the true con¬
struction to be given to the said Will in order to carry out
10 M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
the intention of the Testator, and that so long as the Trus¬
tees do not deplete the value of the corpus of the Estate as
the Testator left it, they have full power under the terms
of the said Will in acquiring new property, to assume or
give a purchase money trust for what they, in their
12 discretion, consider is the excess value of the prop¬
erty acquired over the value of the property sold.
Your petitioners further aver that the then Trustees, in
acquiring the said Edmonds Building in 1924, did, in their
judgment and discretion, believe its true value to be in
excess of the yalue of the property then sold to the extent of
the trusts given or assumed, and that the purchase of the
Edmonds Building, subject to the terms above set forth,
would be in the best interests of the said Estate. That in
giving or assuming the said purchase money trusts on the
Edmonds Building for the excess value thereof over the
value of the property sold, the then Trustees did not deplete
the value of the corpus of the Estate as the Testator left it.
IX. Your petitioners further aver that of the $250,000 of
notes secured on the Edmonds Building, under the deed of
trust dated January 7, 1924, referred to in the third para¬
graph of this petition, $225,000 of said notes have been
extended to January 27, 1934 and are now held by the
Acacia Mutual Life Association, and $25,000 of said notes
have been extended to Januarv 7, 1932 and are now held bv
the Potomac Insurance Company, which company has in¬
formed your petitioners that it wishes these $25,000 notes
paid at the date of extension maturity.
Your petitioners further aver that as the said Will re¬
quires the corpus of this Estate to be invested in real estate,
they have no cash in their hands belonging to the corpus of
the said Estate with which to pay the said notes when the
same become due, and if the said $25,000 of notes are not
then paid the remaining $225,000 of notes will, under the
terms of the said deed of trust, immediately fall due,
13 and the said property will be sold and the proceeds
applied first in payment of the $225,000 note, and the
balance to the $25,000 as provided im the terms of the said
deed of trust.
Your petitioners further aver that they are advised that
many pieces of real estate in this city have recently been
sold at auction but in most instances there are few active
bidders and most of such sales have resulted in the note¬
holders purchasing the property themselves. That in the
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 11
present depressed condition of the real estate market, your
petitioners fear that if the said Edmonds Building were
now advertised for sale under the terms of the said deed
of trust, its value would be lost to the Andrews Estate to
the great hardship and detriment thereof and that a fore¬
closure might result in a deficiency judgment wh^ch would
consume all, or a large part of the trust estate.
X. Your petitioners further aver that all the living resid¬
uary adult heirs under the said Will, and Walter S. An¬
drews in his individual right, have made and executed an
Indenture of Ratification and Authorization, signed and
accepted by the petitioners herein, a copy whereof is hereto
appended and prayed to be read as part of this petition.
That all of the parties hereto were parties to the said In¬
denture, excepting Paul A. Andrews, who as oiie of the
Trustees, purchased the Edmonds Building, and joined in
the execution of the instruments to acquire and fiiiance the
same, and also as one of the then Trustees made and exe¬
cuted the said deed of trust dated January 7, 1924 and the
said $250,000 of notes secured thereby; and excepting the
defendant Margaret A. Belmont, a minor.
That by the terms of the said Indenture, the said
14 parties thereto have nunc pro tunc ratified, confirmed
and approved the purchase of the property im¬
proved by the Edmonds Building, and the execution and
delivery of the said deed of trust dated January 7,1924, and
the execution and delivery and extension of the sapid $250,-
000 of notes secured thereby, representing the balance of
the purchase money due.
That by the terms of the said Indenture, the said parties
thereto did covenant, agree and declare with eacji other,
and with the petitioners herein as follows: |
“The present Trustees and their successors arb hereby
authorized and vested with the power to encumber the prop¬
erty described in the said deed of trust dated Jahuary 7,
1924 and, recorded January 28, 1924 in Liber 5162 at Folio
85 of the Land Records of the District of Columbia] and/or
any other property belonging to the said estate, by mort¬
gage or deed of trust in continuation or renewal or re¬
renewals of the aforesaid deed of trust in the anjount of
$250,000 or any part thereof, upon such terms as tq rate of
interest, duration and time and mode of repayment of
the loan, or any part thereof and in all other respects, as
12 M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
shall be approved by the said Trustees, or the survivor of
them, and their successors .’ 9
And by the said Indenture the said parties thereto did
ratify and confirm whatever the said Trustees have done,
or may do, by virtue of the said instrument.
XI. Your petitioners further aver that in order to pay
off the said $25,000 of notes dated January 7, 1924 when
they fall due next January, and the balance of the said first
trust loan in the sum of $225,000 which falls due in January
1934, all representing the balance due on the purchase price
of the said property, it will be necessary for the said Trus¬
tees to execute new notes secured by new deeds of
15 trust, and they cannot advantageously borrow $25,-
000 next January on what would be a second trust
on the Edmonds Building, for the remaining part of the
first trust amounting to $225,000 does not become due until
January 1934. With the authorization of the Court the said
Trustees could borrow a sufficient sum to make said pay¬
ment and defray other charges on first trust notes secured
on the said Grafton Hotel or the said Wendell Mansions,
belonging to the said Estate, both of which properties are
unincumbered, thereby preserving the said Estate and pre¬
venting waste thereto, which would be irreperable, unless
this authority is granted.
XII. Your petitioners further represent that on the real
estate belonging to the Estate of Frank W. Andrews, de¬
ceased, is a hotel about 35 years old, an apartment house,
and an office building. That due to the depressed condi¬
tion of real estate in the City of Washington, these proper¬
ties are not producing the income which was previously
derived from them, and the net earnings have greatly di¬
minished, principally due to vacancies. That your peti¬
tioners are unable at the present time to state whether they
will have on hand sufficient funds with which to pay taxes
and other charges when they become due, and therefore ask
leave of this Honorable Court, if necessity should arise, to
borrow necessary money to meet taxes and other charges,
in order to preserve the said Estate and to prevent waste.
XIII. Your i petitioners are further advised and aver
that this Court, in the exercise of its broad Chancery
powers and jurisdiction to administer trust estates, and to
remove clouds from the title of the trust Res, direct trus¬
tees and conserve and protect the assets thereof for the
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
13
benefit of all persons who may have any interest
16 or possibility of interest therein, and especially in
the interest of minor or unborn beneficiaries, may
not only construe the provisions of said Last ^ill and
Testament of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, as thereinbe¬
fore prayed, but may give such interpretation thereto as
will carry out the real intent of the Testator to preserve
the trust estate during the existence of the trust, and if it
should find that the assumption and renewal of tfye afore¬
said prior existing trust upon the Edmonds Building and
the giving of said new trust in payment or renewal thereof,
or substitution therefor, was for the best interest of the
Trust Estate, and that, in order to save and protect the
Trust Estate from loss, the existing trust should be re¬
newed, reduced or extended and/or that any other real or
personal property of the Estate should be mortgaged or
pledged for the protection and conservation of tlje Trust
Estate as a whole, it may instruct, authorize and direct
your petitioners, as Trustees, to make whatever payments,
sales, loans, encumbrances or financial arrangements may
be necessary to that end and to carry the same inj;o effect
by such notes, contracts, mortgages and/or other instru¬
ments of conveyance and/or other evidences of indebted¬
ness as may be requisite.
Wherefore, the premises considered, the said petitioners
pray as follows:
1. That process of this Honorable Court may issue forth¬
with to the defendants, Frank W. Andrews, Wiljiam T.
Andrews, John K. C. Andrews, Margaret Andrews Belmont
and Paul A. Andrews and each of them, and to the defend¬
ant Margaret A. Belmont, a minor, (as provided by Sec.
102 of the Code of Law for the District of Columbia,) to¬
gether with a copy of this petition, requiring them
17 and each of them to appear and answer to this peti¬
tion, answer by them and each of them under oath
being hereby expressly waived.
2. That thereafter a guardian ad litem may be duly ap¬
pointed for the defendant Margaret A. Belmont, a minor,
to appear for and defend this petition for said minor.
3. That the petitioners may have substitute service by
way of publication against such of the defendants ^s may
be returned by the Marshal not to be found within tjhe Dis¬
trict of Columbia and who do not personally appejar and
make answer to this petition.
14
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
4. That a decree may be entered ratifying, confirming
and approving the purchase by the then Trustees of Lot
9, Square 218, with improvements thereon, known as the
Edmonds Building, upon the trusts and subject to a former
deed of trust in the sum of $250,000, set forth in the said
deed in trust conveying title to the said Trustees.
5. That a decree may be entered herein ratifying, con¬
firming and approving the execution and delivery by the
then Trustees of the said deed of trust, dated January 7,
1924, and recorded in Liber 5162 at Folio 65 of the Land
Records of the District of Columbia, and the notes secured
thereby, in the sum of $250,000, on said Lot 9, Square 218,
the said money being loaned for the purpose of paying off
the then present first deed of trust for $250,000 on said
property.
6. That a decree may be entered herein ratifying, con¬
firming and approving the extension by the present Trus¬
tees of the said $250,000 first trust notes dated January 7,
1924, secured by the said deed of trust on said Lot 9, Square
218, with improvements thereon, and authorizing the said
Trustees and their successors, to encumber the said
18 property by mortgage or deed of trust in continua¬
tion or renewal of the aforesaid deed of trust thereon,
in the sum of $250,000 or any part thereof, at such times
and upon such terms and conditions as shall be approved
by the said Trustees, or the survivors or survivor of them
and their or his successors.
7. That a decree may be entered herein construing the
said Will of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, to authorize and
empower the Trustees acting under the said Will to en¬
cumber by mortgage or deed of trust, any piece or parcel
of real estate owned by the said Estate, in continuation or
renewal, or re-renewal, of a deed of trust on one parcel,
given to secure the balance of the unpaid purchase price
of said parcel, in an amount equal to the unpaid purchase
price, or any part thereof, at such times and upon such
terms and conditions as shall be approved by the said
Trustees, or the survivors or survivor of them, and their
or his successors, and to execute such notes, contracts,
mortgages, de$ds, deeds of trust and/or other instruments
as may be requisite, without obligation on the part of the
mortgagee, pledgee, or transferee to see to the application
of the money paid or loaned.
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
15
8. That in order to preserve the said Estate of fhe said
Frank W. Andrews, deceased, from loss, and to provide
necessary funds to meet existing encumbrances, charges
and taxes when they fall due, a decree be entered herein
authorizing and empowering the said Trustees acting under
the said Will, to borrow an amount equal to the principal
amount of existing encumbrances, charges and taxes, or any
portion thereof, at such times, and upon such terhas and
conditions as shall be approved by the said Trustees,
19 or the survivors or survivor of them, theiij or his
successors, and as they may consider for the best
interests of the Trust Estate and to secure payment thereof
by mortgage, pledge, and/or deed or deeds of trust, secured
on any or all pieces or parcels of real estate owned by the
said Estate, or any part thereof, and to renew and/or re¬
renew the same and/or extend the time for payment and
to execute and deliver such notes, contracts, mortgages,
deeds of trust and/or other instruments as may be requisite,
without obligation on the part of the mortgagee, pledgee or
transferee to see to the application of the money raaid or
loaned.
9. That this petition may be retained for such further in¬
structions, orders and decrees as the Trustees or any other
parties to the cause may deem necessary or the necessities
of the case cr protection of the Trust Estate may require.
10. That the costs of these proceedings of all parties
hereto with reasonable counsel fees be taxed against the
corpus of the said Estate.
11. That they may have such other and further relief as
the nature of the case may require.
WALTER S. ANDREWS,
In His Own Right and as Trustee .
REGINALD S. HUIDEKOPER,
Substituted Trustee.
MORGAN BELMONT, !
Substituted Trustee.
McKENNEY, FLANNERY & CRAIGHILL, !
By J. S. FLANNERY,
Attorneys for Petitioners .
20 District of Columbia, ss:
I, Reginald S. Huidekoper, being first duly sworn, de¬
pose and say that I am one of the petitioners naiped in
16
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
the foregoing petition by me subscribed, and that I have
read the foregoing petition and know the contents thereof,
and that the matters and facts set forth upon personal
knowledge are true and those matters and facts set forth
upon information and belief, I believe to be true.
REGINALD S. HTJIDEKOPER.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 1st day of Dec.,
1931.
[notarial SEAL.] B. P. ISAACS.
Decree.
Filed Jan. 19, 1932.
• •••*• •
Upon consideration of the petition of Walter S. Andrews,
Reginald S. Huidekoper and Morgan Belmont, Trustees
of the Estate of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, the answers
of the adult defendants and the answer and report of F.
Regis Noel, Guardian ad litem of the minor defendant
Margaret A. Belmont, and it appearing to the Court that
process has been duly served upon said infant defendant
and upon her custodian, and the Court having considered
the provisions of the will of said decedent, the briefs of
counsel for the respective parties and the evidence filed in
this cause, and it appearing from said evidence as to the
character and value of the properties of the trust estate,
the income therefrom, the encumbrances, taxes, expenses
of suit and other charges which it will be necessary to pay
and discharge immediately or in the near future,
21 that the Trustees are without funds to pay said en¬
cumbrances and other obligations now due or shortly
maturing, and that failure to pay the same will subject the
trust estate to great and irreparable loss, and the Court
being advised that in order to preserve the valuable prop¬
erties of the estate from sacrifice and to provide necessary
funds to pay said encumbrances and obligations it will be
for the best interest of the trust estate and of all persons
having any vested or contingent interest therein and es¬
pecially for the benefit and advantage of said infant de¬
fendant, to borrow a sum of not to exceed Three Hundred
Fifty Thousand Dollars ($350,000) and to secure the same
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDBEWS ET AL. 17
by a first mortgage or deed of trust upon the prpperties
now comprising the trust estate,—it is this 19th day of
January A. D. 1932, adjudged, ordered and decreed:
I. The several sales, purchases, transfers and exchanges
of various properties of the trust estate and the application
of the proceeds of such sales and transfers as set forth in
the evidence be and the same hereby are approved;
II. The reinvestment of a porton of said proceeds in the
purchase for the sum of Six Hundred Thousand Dollars
($600,000) of Lot No. 9 in Square 218 in the City of Wash¬
ington, D. C., improved by the Edmonds Building, subject
to a then first mortgage or deed of trust for Two E/undred
Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000), and the placing piereon
of two other purchase money trusts aggregating OijLe Hun¬
dred Fifty-seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($157,-
500), and the subsequent renewal of said original mortgage
by the execution and delivery of a new deed of trust dated
January 7th, 1924, recorded in Liber 5162, fol|o 65 of
22 the Land Records of the District of Columbia, and
the subsequent extension thereof, and the payment
and discharge of said two purchase money mortgages with
funds of the trust estate were proper exercises | of the
powers, discretion and authority given to the Trustees by
the will of said decedent and are hereby approved;
III. It appearing from the evidence that the ium of
Thirty-two Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-two Dollars
and Six Cents ($32,982.06) was taken from the incbme of
the estate and used for capital expenditures, the Trustees
are hereby authorized and directed to reimburse and re¬
store to income said amount and to make the necesshrv ad¬
justment and charges against capital in their accounts to be
hereafter submitted to the Court, and when the said s^mount
is restored to income, to distribute the same to the life ten-
7 I
ants entitled thereto, in quarterly installments of One
Thousand Dollars ($1,000) to each beneficiary;
IV. The Trustees are further authorized and directed to
pay out of the corpus of the trust estate, and to take credit
therefor in their accounts to be hereafter submitted, to said
F. Regis Noel, for his services as Guardian ad lite\n and
attorney for said infant defendant, a fee of five hundred
dollars; the agreed compensation of the expert appraisers
2—6025a
18 M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
and witnesses; the fees of the attorneys for the Trustees
in this proceeding and all other costs, expenses and charges
connected with this litigation, and the expense of making
and renewing loans;
V. It appearing that the net income of the trust estate
probably will be insufficient to pay the taxes, insurance, in¬
terest upon encumbrances and other charges upon the
various properties of the estate, the Trustees are hereby
authorized to charge the same, or any part thereof,
23 to the corpus of the trust while a deficiency of net in¬
come exists and to pay the same out of the proceeds
of the loan hereinafter authorized;
VI. The Trustees are hereby further authorized to pay
from the proceeds of said loan any amount now due them
for commissions and expenses;
VII. In order to provide for the payment of said first
mortgage of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,-
000), upon the Edmonds Building, as and when it falls due,
and to make the other payments and disbursements herein¬
before authorized, the Trustees are hereby authorized, em¬
powered and directed to make whatever arrangements may
be necessary for the renewal, extension and/or payment of
the existing encumbrances or any part thereof and to bor¬
row’ a sum of not to exceed Three Hundred Fiftv Thousand
Dollars ($350,000) upon the best terms obtainable, in such
instalments, at such times and at such rates of interest as
they may consider for the best interest of the trust estate,
and to secure the same by the mortgage of any and/or all
of the properties of the trust estate and especially of the
following parcels, to w 7 it:
(1) Lots numbered Three (3) and Four (4) in Mary A.
Derby’s subdivision of Square One Hundred Sixty-two
(162), as per plat recorded in Liber W. B. M. at folio Four
Hundred One (401) of the records of the Surveyor of the
District of Columbia, improved by premises knovm as the
Grafton Hotel;
(2) Lot numbered Fourteen (14) in Block numbered
Tw’elve (12) in Rodgers and Stelhvagen, trustees’ subdi¬
vision knovm as “Kalorama Heights”, as per plat
24 recorded in Liber County 7 at Folio 34 in the Sur-
vevors Office of the District of Columbia; said Block
12 now knowm for the purposes of assessment and taxation
as Square numbered Twenty-five hundred and seventeen
19
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
(2517), impoved by premises known as the Wendell
Mansions;
(3) Lot numbered Nine (9) in Square Two Hundred
Eighteen (218), improved by premises known as the Ed¬
monds Building, all in the City of Washington, in the Dis¬
trict of Columbia,
and from time to time, as occasion may arise, to arrange
for the extension, renewal and/or payment of the amount
borrowed or any part thereof;
VIII. In amplification of the powers contained in the
will of said decedent and of the additional powers given by
this decree, said Trustees are hereby authorized and em¬
powered to make, execute and deliver such contracts, guar¬
anties, assignments, promissory notes, mortgages, fleeds of
trust, deeds and/or other instruments of conveyance or
title as may be requisite, without obligation upon the part
of the mortgagees or transferees to see to the application
of the money paid or loaned;
IX. Jurisdiction of this cause is hereby retained for such
further instructions, orders and decrees as the Trustees or
any other party to the cause may deem necessary or the
necessities of the case may require.
JESSE C. ADKINfjs,
Justice.
No objection.
F. R. NOEL,
Guardian ad Litem for
Margaret A. Belmont.
I consent to the passage of above decree.
BENJ. S. MINOR,
Atty. for Paul A. Andrews.
25 Petition and Report of Trustees.
Filed Apr. 8,1932.
******
To the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, holding
an Equity Court:
The petition of Walter S. Andrews, surviving Testa¬
mentary Trustee, and Reginald S. Huidekoper and ^lorgan
Belmont, Substituted Trustees, of the Estate of Fr^nk W.
Andrews, deceased, respectfully shows unto the Court as
follows:
20 M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
1. As averred in the “ Petition to Construe Will and In¬
struct Trustees”, filed in this cause on December 1, 1931,
your petitioner, Walter S. Andrews, together with Paul A.
Andrews, and Oscar Luckett (since deceased), were named
trustees under the Will of the said Frank W. Andrews,
deceased. By decree of this Honorable Court, entered in
Equity cause No. 31656 on the 16tli day of May, 1913, your
petitioner, Reginald S. Huidekoper, was substituted Trus¬
tee under the said Will, vice Oscar Luckett, deceased, and
by further decree entered in said Equity Cause No. 31656
on the 14th day of January, 1929, your petitioner, Morgan
Belmont, was substituted Trustee under said Will vice Paul
A. Andrews, whose resignation as Trustee was accepted by
said last mentioned decree. All of the proceedings, plead¬
ings, orders, decrees, accounts, reports, Auditor’s reports,
documents and exhibits which are matters of record in said
Equity cause No. 31656, are prayed to be referred to and
considered as part of this petition.
2. The Testator’s widow, Maria F. Andrews, who had
control of the Testator’s Estate during her lifetime, died
on November 22, 1914, and this trust became active
26 on December 1, 1914.
When the Trustees assumed active management of
the Estate, it consisted of five pieces of improved real
estate in this District, namely:
The Grafton Hotel, at Connecticut Avenue and DeSales
Street;
The Savoy Apartment House, 2804 14th St. N. W.;
No. 1761 Massachusetts Avenue N. W., the testator’s
residence;
Nos. 1311-1313 F St. N. W., being one building, subject
to a deed of trust of $30,000 given by the testator;
No. 1309 F St. N. W., subject to a deed of trust of $40,000
given by the testator, and
Household effects appraised at $4,000 and later sold by
the Trustees for that sum.
Acting under the authority conferred upon them by the
will of the testator, the Trustees made the following sales
and reinvestments of the proceeds thereof:
On October 1st, 1917, they sold the Savoy Apartment
House and purchased the Wendell Mansions, 2339 Massa¬
chusetts Avenue N. W., for $120,000;
21
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
On July 10th, 1918, they sold No. 1761 Massachusetts
Avenue N. W., and used the proceeds to curtail the trusts
on the F Street properties;
On January 1st, 1920, they sold Nos. 1311-1313 F Street
N. W., and purchased No. 1411 G Street N. W., with a part
of the proceeds and used the balance to curtail liens on the
trust property;
On July 30th, 1923, they sold No. 1309 F Street N. W.,
and purchased the Edmonds Building, 915-917 15th Street
N. W., improved by a ten-story building of concrete and
fireproof construction, for a consideration of $600;000;
On December 7th, 1926, they sold No. 1411 G Street
N. W., at a profit of $32,802.50, and used part of the pro¬
ceeds to curtail liens on the Edmonds Building.
The Estate now consists of the Edmonds Building, hav r
ing a present assessed value of $401,400, which is encum¬
bered by a first trust of $225,000; the Graftdn Hotel,
27 having a present assessed value of $384,020, and
which is encumbered by a first trust of $125,^)00: and
the Wendell Mansions, having a present assessed ]value of
$109,862, and which is unencumbered.
The Trustees ’ Revised Capital Account, which is at¬
tached hereto as Exhibit “ A” and prayed to be riad as a
part hereof, contains a condensed summary of the sales of
capital assets, the investment and reinvestment anc| the ap¬
plication of the proceeds thereof, curtail of loans, etc., from
the date the trust became active until December 31st, 1931.
Said Account is based upon reports heretofore filed \vith the
Auditor in Equity Cause No. 31,656 and indicates that dur¬
ing the period in question $40,434.23 was advanced by in¬
come to capital, as hereinafter more fully set forth.
3. Covering the entire period from December 1, 1914, to
April 16, 1931, reports have been made in said Equity
Cause No. 31656 of all receipts and disbursements of the
said Trust Estate as follows: Beginning on April 17, 1915,
and annually in the month of April in each year thereafter,
including April, 1931, your petitioner Reginald S. Huide-
koper, as Substituted Trustee, as aforesaid, has filed in said
Equity Cause No. 31656 his report to the Auditor of the
Court under Rule 69 thereof, which reports of Apr^l, 1929,
1930 and 1931, respectively, were made in the joint names
of Reginald S. Huidekoper and Morgan Belmont, $s Sub¬
stituted Trustees of said Estate, under decree in said
Equity
Cause No. 31656.
22
M.; A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
4. The said annual reports made to the Auditor in said
Equity Cause No. 31656 in addition to complying with the
requirements of Rule 69, contain the following informa¬
tion, data and accounts respecting the properties belonging
to the said Estate and the management thereof, since
28 the date of the last previous report:
(A) The properties held in trust under the Testator’s
Will, the sales and purchases, if any, since the last previous
report, and any changes affecting the Capital Assets, to¬
gether with a report of the receipts and disbursements cov¬
ering such transactions.
(B) Itemized statements of all receipts and disburse¬
ments and balance on hand appearing in the “Income Ac¬
count” of said Trustee, supported by vouchers, together
with paid and cancelled checks covering the disbursement
items which iwere exhibited to the Auditor and checked by
him with said itemized accounts filed in Equity Cause No.
31656 and found to correspond therewith.
No formal audit of these accounts was made bv the Audi-
tor, although annually the said Paul A. Andrew’s and Walter
S. Andrews,!as the sole persons then entitled to the income
from said Estate, have approved each and every item of dis¬
bursement showm in said annual accounts, which cover the
period from December 1, 1914, to April 16, 1931.
5. Owdng to the fact that the provisions of the Will of the
said Testator required all funds derived from the sale of
real estate to be reinvested in other productive real estate,
the Trustees of this Estate have been unable to create a
capital cash | fund vdtli which to meet capital obligations,
such as payment of curtails and extensions of loans, capi¬
tal betterments and charges, and frequently these have been
paid out of income with the consent of Paul A. Andrews and
Walter S. Andrews, the beneficiaries entitled to the net in¬
come from said Estate.
6. By decree entered herein on January 19, 1932, it was
directed that the sum of $32,982.06, which appeared
29 from the evidence to have been taken from income
and used for capital expenditures, should be restored
to income and distributed to the life beneficiaries entitled
to the net income and the said Trustees should make the
necessary adjustments and changes in their accounts to be
thereafter submitted to the Court and when the said amount
is restored to income, to distribute the same to the life ten-
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 23
ants entitled thereto, in quarterly installments of $1,000.00
to each beneficiary.
Said decree expressly retained jurisdiction of t^ie cause
“for such further instructions, orders and decrees as the
Trustees or any other party to the cause may dee^n neces¬
sary or the necessities of the case may require.”
7. Your petitioners have hereunto annexed and marked
“Exhibit B” and pray to be read as part hereof^ a sum¬
mary of the said Income Account heretofore filec} in said
Equity Cause No. 31656, covering the period front Decem¬
ber 1, 1914, to April 16, 1931, showing all receipts and dis¬
bursements credited and debited to the Income Account as
made, with such items therein as should have been charged
and debited to the Capital Account, marked with a star (*).
Your petitioners have hereunto annexed and marked
“Exhibit C”, their supplemental Income Account showing
in itemized form all receipts and disbursements credited
and debited to Income as made, carrying the said Income
Account from April 16, 1931, to December 31, 193JL, which
your petitioners are prepared to support by vouchers and
cancelled checks. In said account the items of payment
which should have been paid by Capital are similarly
marked with a star (*).
8. The items in Exhibits B and C shown as Receipts
30 from the Savoy Apartment, the Wendell Mansions
and the Edmonds Building, are the actual (fash re¬
ceipts of this estate from the operating agents of su<fh prop¬
erties.
There is appended hereto and marked “Exhibit ID” and
prayed to be read as part of this petition a statement of
Randall H. Hagner & Co., rental agents for the ^Yendell
Mansions, showing that out of the rents collected, tlfey paid
out of gross rents and deducted therefrom the sum of
$1,213.78 for Frigidaire equipment in the Wendell Mansions
and for Architect’s fee in remodeling for additional bath
rooms, which said sum of $1,213.78 thereby becam^ a dis¬
bursement made by Income in behalf of Capital.
9. There is hereto appended and marked “Exhibit E”
and prayed to be read as part of this petition, a summary of
the items marked with a star (*) in the Income Accounts set
forth in “Exhibits B” and “C”, and the items hi “Ex¬
hibit D”. The said “Exhibit E” covers the period from
December 1, 1914, to December 31, 1931, and lists all pay¬
ments made during said period, by Income on behalf of
24
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
Capital, and payments made by Capital on behalf of In¬
come, resulting in excess payments made by Income on be¬
half of Capital during the said period, in the sum of
$40,434.23, which is the same sum as shown by ‘ 4 Exhibit A”
to be the cash deficiency in the Capital Account existing as
of December 31, 1931.
10. By said decree of January 19, 1932, your petitioners
were “authorized, empowered and directed to make what¬
ever arrangements mav be necessarv for the renewal, ex-
tension and for payment of existing encumbrances or any
part thereof and to borrow a sum not to exceed $350,000
upon the best terms obtainable, in such installments and at
such rates of interest as they mav consider for the
31 best interest of the trust estate, and to secure the
same by the mortgage of any and/or all of the prop¬
erties of the trust estate'’ * * * and “to make, execute
and deliver such contracts, guaranties, assignments, prom¬
issory notes, mortgages, deeds of trust, deeds, and or other
instruments dr conveyance or title as may lie requisite”.
In accordance with the provisions of the said decree, your
petitioners secured a sixty day extension of the $25,000 of
notes due January 27, 1932, secured on the Edmonds Build¬
ing, to give them an opportunity to arrange loans authorized
bv the said decree.
In order to pay off said $25,000 notes (extended to March
27,1932) and to meet the obligations due and to become due,
the best terms obtainable by your petitioners, which they
considered to the best interests to the estate to accept, and
therefore did accept and enter into, were as follows: The
said petitioners did make and execute their deed of trust
dated February 9, 1932, recorded February 15, 1932, secur¬
ing Edward A. King in the sum of $125,000 represented by
notes of equal amount payable “on or before five years after
date”, which said notes were secured bv the said deed of
trust on the Grafton Hotel property owned by the said es¬
tate. The said Edward A. King endorsed said notes “with¬
out recourse” to your petitioners, who deposited them as
collateral with the National Savings & Trust Company
under an agreement that the said Trust Company would
loan to your petitioners, during the years 1932 and 1933,
on collateral demand notes, secured by the said real estate
notes “such sums as the necessities of the Andrews Estate
may required, not to exceed the sum of $100,000.00, and
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 25
charge interest thereon only from the dates of the
32 partial loans.
That thereafter your petitioners borrowed from
the said National Savings & Trust Company on their de-
mand notes payable to the said Trust Company, in accord¬
ance with the said agreement, $36,000 and have pai d off the
said $25,000 of notes extended to March 27, 1932, as shown
by the Account hereto attached.
11. Your petitioners have hereto annexed and marked
“Exhibit F”, and prayed to be read as part hereof, their
Capital Account from January 1, 1932, to April 1st, 1932,
which shows the disposition made of the moneys borrowed
from the National Savings & Trust Company, including a
statement of the expenses of this proceeding, and “Exhibit
G”, their Income Account from January 1, 1932, to April
1st, 1932, which they pray may be read as part of this
petition, and the said petitioners are prepared to support
the said accounts by vouchers and cancelled cheeky.
12. Due to the fact that all the real estate belonging to
this estate was in the City of Washington, and tiat Paul
A. Andrews and Walter S. Andrews, two of the three Trus¬
tees under said Will, were non-residents of the District of
Columbia, an agreement for the more effective manage¬
ment of said Estate, dated December 24, 1914, was entered
into bv and between the said Paul A. Andrews and Walter
S. Andrews, each in his own right as devisee under the
said Will, and jointly as surviving Trustees thereunder,
and the said Reginald S. Huidekoper, as Substituted Trus¬
tee under said Will, whereby the latter should, Amongst
other things, collect rents, discharge obligations, Heep the
accounts of the said Estate, and in return for such services
the said Reginald S. Huidekoper should deduct
33 quarterly 3 per cent of the total gross receipts of
said Estate and retain said amount as his Commis-
mission for services as Managing Co-Trustee.
The said agreement was amended by agreement dated
May 21, 1917, between the said life tenants and the said
Reginald S. Huidekoper as Co-Trustee, fixing the latter’s
commission as Trustee at 5 per cent (instead of 3 p^r cent)
of the gross receipts of said Estate, to be deducted quar¬
terly from the funds in his possession. A similar piovision
was contained in an agreement dated April 3, 1929, between
Walter S. Andrews in his own right as devisee under said
Will, and as Trustee, Morgan Belmont, as Substituted
26
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
Trustee, and the said Reginald S. Huidekoper, as Substi¬
tuted Trustee.
Wherefore, your petitioners pray:
1. That a Rule to Show Cause may be issued to Frank
W. Andrews, William T. Andrews, John K. C. Andrews,
Margaret Andrews Belmont, Paul A. Andrews (to be
served on Benjamin S. Minor, his attorney of record), and
Margaret A. Belmont, a minor (to be served on her guar¬
dian ad litem\ F. Regis Xoel), the defendants herein, ac¬
companied by a copy of this petition and the Account here¬
with submitted, requiring said defendants, and each of
them, to show cause why the prayers of this petition should
not be granted and said Account accepted and continued
without reference to the Auditor so as to save expense and
delay; and in case of any objection being filed to said Ac¬
count bv anv of said defendants, that same mav be re-
ferred to the Auditor for appropriate action;
2. That the Account herewith submitted be accepted and
confirmed as the Account of the petitioners Walter S. An¬
drews and Reginald S. Huidekoper, as trustee and sub¬
stituted trustee, respectively, of the Estate of Frank
.‘14 W. Andrews, deceased, for the period from Decem¬
ber 1, 1914, to April 1st, 1932, and as the Account
of Morgan Belmont, substituted Trustee of the said Estate,
from the date of his appointment, viz., January 14, 1929,
to April 1st, 1932;
3. That the Trustees of the said Estate be authorized to
make report annually under Rule 69 of this Honorable
Court in this Equity Cause Xo. 53,738 and that they be
hence relieved from making report under said Rule 69 in
Equity Cause Xo. 31656;
4. That jurisdiction of this cause may be retained for
such further orders and instructions regarding the admin¬
istration of the trust estate as mav be deemed necessarv
upon application of anv of the parties to this cause.
! WALTER S. AXDREWS,
REGIXALD S. HUIDEKOPER,
MORGAX BELMOXT,
Trustees of the Estate of Frank
W. Andrews , Deceased.
McKEXXEY, FLAXXERY & CRAIGHILL,
Bv J. S. FLAXXERY,
Attorneys for Petitioners.
27
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
District of Columbia, ss :
I, Reginald S. Huidekoper, do solemnly swear that I have
read the foregoing petition by me subscribed in the ca¬
pacity above indicated and I know the contents j thereof;
that the facts stated upon my personal knowledge are true
and those stated upon information and belief, I believe to
be true.
REGINALD S. HUIDEKOPER.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30 day or March,
1932.
[notarial SEAL.] PHYLLIS 0. BURTNER,
Notary Public, D. S.
35 Decree Approving Account of Trustees.
Filed May 26, 1932.
##*###•
This cause coming on to be heard upon the Petition and
Report and the Supplemental Petition and Report of
Walter S. Andrews, surviving Testamentary Trustee, and
Reginald S. Huidekoper and Morgan Belmont, substituted
Trustees, of the Estate of Frank W. Andrews, deceased,
filed herein on April 8th and May 26th, 1932, the Rule to
Show Cause issued on April 8th, 1932, and the Answers
thereto of Frank W. Andrews, William T. Andrews, John
K. C. Andrew’s, Margaret Andrews Belmont and paul A.
Andrew’s, and the Answer and Report of F. Regjs Noel,
Guardian ad Titan for the defendant, Margaret A. Belmont,
a minor, the only persons interested in said estate ^nd the
questions raised by said Petition and Report and Supple¬
mental Petition and Report, and it appearing to th^ Court
that said adult beneficiaries, by their said answers, consent
to the granting of the prayers of said Petition and the ap¬
proving of the Account therewith submitted, and it further
appearing to the Court that said Account has been audited
by the Guardian ad litem and that lie recommends [the ap¬
proval thereof, and it further appearing to the Cou^t from
said Supplemental Petition and Report that the errors in
said Account disclosed by the audit of the Guardian ad
litem have been corrected, it is, by the Court, this 2^th day
of May, 1932, adjudged, ordered and decreed:
28
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
1. That the Account of the Trustees filed herein on April
8th, 1932, be and the same hereby is accepted and con¬
firmed as the Account of Walter S. Andrews and Reginald
S. Huidekoper, Trustee and substituted Trustee, respec¬
tively, of the Estate of Frank W. Andrews, deceased,
36 for the period from December 1, 1914, to April 1,
1932, and as the Account of Morgan Belmont, substi¬
tuted Trustee of the said Estate, from the date of his ap¬
pointment, January 14,1929, to April 1,1932;
2. That the said Trustees be and thev herebv are author-
ized to make report annually under Rule 69 of this Honor¬
able Court in this Equity Cause Xo. 53,738 and that they
be and they hereby are relieved from making report under
said Rule 69 in Equity Cause No. 31,656;
3. That jurisdiction of this cause be retained for such
further orders and instructions regarding the administra¬
tion of the trust estate as may be deemed necessary upon
application of any of the parties to this cause.
JESSE C. ADKINS,
Justice .
No objection.
F. REGIS NOEL,
Quar/fian ad Lit cm for Margaret A. Belmont.
BENJ. S. MINOR,
Atty. for Paul A. Andrews.
Supplemental Petition of Trustees for I)istructions.
Filed Aug. 15, 1932.
#*####*
The petition of Walter S. Andrews, Reginald S. Huide¬
koper and Morgan Belmont, Trustees of the Estate of
Frank W. Andrews, deceased, respectfully represents to the
Court as follows:
1. Heretofore, on to wit, December 1, 1931, your
37 petitioner Walter S. Andrews, as Testamentary
Trustee, and your petitioners Reginald S. Huide¬
koper and Morgan Belmont, as Substituted Trustees under
the Will of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, filed their peti¬
tion against the defendants above named, which petition
was entitled “Petition to Construe Will and Instruct Trus¬
tees”. Answers of all the adult defendants, and an an-
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
29
swer and report of F. Regis Noel, Guardian ad litem of the
minor defendant Margaret A. Belmont, having been filed,
evidence taken and filed, this Honorable Court on tb wit the
19th day of January 1932, entered its decree herein author¬
izing the said Trustees to borrow funds, in accordance with
the terms and to effect the objects of said said decree,
which amongst other things, expressly provided as fol¬
lows :
“III. It appearing from the evidence that the sum of
Thirty-two Thousand Nine Hundred and Eightv-two Dol-
V O V
lars and Six Cents ($32,982.06) was taken from the income
of the estate and used for capital expenditures, the Trustees
are herebv authorized and directed to reimburse and re-
•/
store to income said amount and to make the necessarv ad-
justment and charges against capital in their accounts to be
hereafter submitted to the Court, and when the said amount
is restored to income, to distribute the same to the life
tenants entitled thereto, in quarterly installments of One
Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) to each beneficiary. * ’
“VIII. In amplification of the powers contained in the
Will of said decedent and of the additional powers given
by this decree, said Trustees are hereby authorised and
empowered to make, execute and deliver such contracts,
guarantees, assignments, promissory notes, mortgages,
deeds of trust, deeds and/or other instruments of convey¬
ance or title as may be requisite, without obligatiorj on the
part of the mortgagee or transferee to see to the Applica¬
tion of the money paid or loaned.”
“XI. Jurisdiction of this cause is hereby retailed for
such further instructions, orders and decrees as the Trus¬
tees or any other party to the cause may deem necessary
or the necessities of the case may require.”
2. Thereafter, on, to wit, April 8, 1932, your petitioners
filed herein their “Petition and Report of Trustees”,
38 stating their account as Trustees from December 1,
1914, to April 1, 1932, which showed that Jail ex¬
penditures made by the Trustees of the said Estate, both
on behalf of Capital and Income, had been approved as
made by the beneficiaries then entitled to the incom|c from
the said Estate, namely the petitioner Walter S. Andrews,
and the defendant Paul A. Andrews, the only surviving
children and sons of the said Testator, Frank W. Aiidrews.
That the said “Petition and Report of Trustees” showed
30
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
amongst other things, that your petitioners, as Trustees
as aforesaid, had secured their promissory notes in the
sum of $125,000.00 on certain real estate, which promis¬
sory notes they had deposited with a certain Trust Com¬
pany in the City of Washington, under the agreement with
the said Trust Company that it would loan from time to
time to the said Trustees, on demand notes executed by
them and secured bv their said real estate notes, such
amounts as they might require to meet the obligations of
the said Estate, and to restore to Income from Capital for
distribution quarterly, such amounts up to an amount fixed,
as they should require pursuant to the said decree of Jan¬
uary 19, 1932. Thereafter, answers having been filed by
the various defendants, including the defendant Paul A.
Andrews, and F. Regis Noel, Guardian ad litem as afore¬
said, a decree! was entered herein, on, to wit, the 26th day
of May, 1932, approving the said accounts of the said
Trustees, your petitioners, herein, and retaining jurisdic¬
tion of this cause for such further instructions, orders and
decrees as the Trustees or any other party to the cause
may deem necessary or the necessities of the case may re¬
quire.
3. The terms of borrowing, as above set forth, were the
best your petitioners were able to secure, and by
39 this method they are able to secure funds for this
estate as required, without paying interest on idle
money, which they would have been required to pay, if all
funds authorized to be borrowed bv the decree of January
19, 1932, had been borrowed in one lump sum. The first
$10,000.00 was borrowed as aforesaid on February 17,
1932, and of th*is amount $2,000.00 was restored to income
and $1,000.00 distributed on the said date to the said Paul
A. Andrews, and $1,000.00 distributed to the said Walter S.
Andrews, pursuant to the said decree of January 19, 1932.
A further sum of $2,000.00 was restored to Income and dis¬
tributed to the said beneficiaries, at the next quarter, viz.,
on May 17, 1932, pursuant to the said decree. An addi¬
tional $26,000.00 was borrowed on demand notes on March
28, 1932, and of the amounts so borrowed there remains in
the hands of your petitioners the sum of $1,926.35, the bal¬
ance of the funds borrowed having been used to meet obli¬
gations of the said Estate maturing and costs of this suit.
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
31
4. Your petitioners are informed and on such informa¬
tion aver that on or about, to wit, the 27th day of May, 1932,
the defendant Paul A. Andrews died, leaving a papjer writ¬
ing termed a last Will and Testament, dated August 17,
1930, a copy whereof is hereto annexed and marked “Ex¬
hibit A”, which is prayed to be read as part hereof. By the
terms of the said paper writing the said Paul A. Andrews
left his entire estate to his second wife, Muriel Abbott An¬
drews, and naming her as his Executrix. Your petitioners
are further informed, and upon such information aVer, that
proceedings have been instituted in the Probate Cjourt of
Suffolk County, Massachusetts, for the probate of the said
Will of Paul A. Andrews, and for the appointment
40 of the said Muriel Abbott Andrews as Executrix
thereof.
5. Your petitioners further aver that the next quarterly
date of restoration to income and distribution of $2,000.00
pursuant to the third paragraph of the decree of January
19, 1932, will be on August 17, 1932, and although your
petitioners will have to borrow an additional amount be¬
fore then, they do not know to whom to pay the sljiare to
which the said Paul A. Andrews would have been entitled,
if living.
The said Muriel Abbott Andrews has claimed and has
asserted that when she has qualified as Executrix of the
Estate of Paul A. Andrews, deceased, she will claim the
quarterly installments to be distributed under the third
paragraph of the decree of January 19, 1932, to which the
said Paul A. Andrews would have been entitled, if living.
The defendant herein, Margaret Andrews Belmont! is the
only child of the said Paul A. Andrews, deceased, and as
such has claimed of your said petitioners and doth claim,
that under the terms of the Will of the said Frahk W.
Andrews, deceased, she alone is entitled after the! death
of her father Paul A. Andrews, and during her lifetime
and until final settlement of this Trust Estate, to oije-half
of the income of the said Estate, including one-half bf the
fund to be restored to Income and distributed aftbr the
said Paul A. Andrews’ death under the terms of the third
paragraph of the said decree of January 19, 1932. The
pertinent provisions of the Will of the said Frank W. An¬
drews, deceased, Grandfather of the defendant Margaret
Andrews Belmont, upon which she bases her claim, ire as
follows: I
32
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
41 61 Sixth. B. All the rest, residue and remainder of
my hereinbefore described estate, I give, devise and
bequeath in fee simple and absolutely, according to the
nature of the property, to my two sons, Paul A. Andrews,
of Newport, Rhode Island and Walter S. Andrews, of
Middletown, in the State of Rhode Island, and to Oscar
Luckett, of Washington, in the District of Columbia, in
trust nevertheless, to and for the following uses, intents
and purposes, viz., to hold, manage and direct the same
during the lives of mv said two sons and the life of the
survivor or longest liver of them, and upon the death of the
survivor or longest liver of mv said two sons, mv Trustees
shall convey in fee simple transfer and pay over said trust
property as it shall then exist and free of any trust or con¬
dition to mv lawful issue then living, thev taking bv repre-
sentation, according to the stocks; * * * and my Trus¬
tees shall dispose of the net rents and income of said trust
property arising before the conveyance just directed, as
follows: They shall pay the said net rents and income dur¬
ing the continuance of this trust by equal quarterly pay¬
ments in every year in equal shares to such of my said two
sons as may be living at the time of payment and to the
lawful issue then living of either of my said two sons who
has then deceased (whether such mv son have died before
or after me) such issue taking by representation accord¬
ing to the stocks the share which such my deceased son
would have taken if living. * * * ”
“Tenth. 1 direct that the income herein bequeathed shall
not lie alienable bv anv beneficiarv either bv assignment or
bv anv other method and the said income shall not be sub-
* •
ject to be taken by his or her creditors by any process
whatsoever. * * *”
“Thirteenth. The decisions of mv Trustees as to anv
questions arising between capital and income shall be final
and binding upon all persons then or thereafter inter¬
ested. * *”
6. Your petitioners are not in doubt as to the rights of
Walter S. Andrews, as beneficiary under the Will of the
said Frank W. Andrews, deceased, and under the decree
of January 19, 1932, in reference to matters set forth in
this petition, and his interest is not affected by the matters
herein set forth.
33
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
Of the defendants heretofore named in the original peti¬
tion and in the Accounting Report of the Trustees hereto¬
fore filed herein the defendants Frank W. Andrews, Wil¬
liam T. Andrews and John K. C. Andrews have nq interest
in the income of this Trust Estate, and ar^ not en-
42 titled to any part of the fund to be distributed under
the third paragraph of the said decree of [January
19,1932, so long as their father, Walter S. Andrew^ is alive
and the said Walter S. Andrews is still alive. Similarly
the defendant Margaret A. Belmont, a minor, jand her
Guardian ad litem , F. Regis Noel, has no such interest so
long as her mother, the defendant Margaret Andrews Bel¬
mont is alive, and she is still alive. All petitions, orders,
decrees, evidence and proceedings heretofore had and en¬
tered in this cause are prayed to be read as pari of this
petition and the death of the said Paul A. Andrews is sug¬
gested.
Wherefore the premises considered, your petitioners
pray:
I. That the death of the defendant heretofore nbmed in
these proceedings, Paul A. Andrews, be recorded herein.
II. That subpoena issue to the defendant Margaret An¬
drews Belmont, and to Muriel Abbott Andrews, as Execu¬
trix under the Will of Paul A. Andrews, deceased, to enter
their appearance herein, answer this petition, and inter¬
plead their claims of rights.
III. That a Rule to Show Cause issue to the defendant
Margaret Andrews Belmont and to Muriel Abbbtt An¬
drews, as the person named as Executrix of the Will of the
said Paul A. Andrews, deceased, requiring them tlo make
answer to this petition under oath and interplead their
claims to the fund referred to in the third paragraph of the
decree passed herein on January 19, 1932, and that the said
Executrix file a certified copy of the proceedings probating
the Will of the said Paul A. Andrews, deceased, and her
qualification as Executrix thereof, provided*a copy
43 of the said Rule to Show Cause together withj a copy
of this petition be sent by registered mail to the last
known address of the said defendant Margaret Aindrews
Belmont, and to the said Muriel Abbott Andrews, in de¬
fault of their voluntary appearance.
3—6025a
34
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
IV. That the Court will enter its order or decree direct¬
ing the petitioners herein, and their successors as Trustees
of the Estate of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, to whom they
shall pay and distrubute quarterly that part of the fund re¬
ferred to in the third paragraph of the said decree of Janu¬
ary 19, 1932, to which the said Paul A. Andrews (now de¬
ceased) would have been entitled if living at the time future
payments and distributions are to be made, and protecting
the said Trustees in making such payments, or authorizing
them to make said payments into the Registry of this Court.
V. That jurisdiction of this cause be retained for such
further instructions, orders and decrees as the Trustees or
anv other partv to the cause mav deem necessarv or the
necessities of the case may require.
VI. That thev mav have such other and further relief as
* *
the nature of the case mav require.
WALTER S. ANDREWS,
REGINALD S. HUIDEKOPER,
MORGAN BELMONT,
Trustees of the Estate of Frank
IT. Andrews, Deceased, Petitioners.
REGINALD S. HUIDEKOPER,
Attorney for Petitioners.
Borough of Manhattan,
State of New York, ss:
I, Morgan Belmont, being first duly sworn, upon oath
depose and say that 1 have read the foregoing and annexed
petition by me subscribed and know the contents thereof
and that the matters therein stated upon my own
44 personal knowledge are true, and the matters af¬
firmatively stated therein on information and be¬
lief, 1 believe to be true.
MORGAN BELMONT.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 1st day of
August, 1932.
" [notarial seal.] HARRY J. DIETRICH,
i Notary Public, Westchester County.
Cert, filed N. Y. County No. 14.
N. Y. Countv Register No. 4D7.
Commission expires March 30, 1934.
I
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 35
Exhibit “A”.
Last Will and Testament of Paul A. Andrews.
i
I, Paul Adams Andrews, of the Borough of Manhattan,
City, County and State of New York, do hereby njake this
as and to be my last will and testament hereby revoking all
former wills and codicils by me at any time heretofore
made.
First. I authorize my Executrix, hereinafter named, to
pay all my just debts and funeral expenses as soon after
my decease as may be convenient.
Second. (A) I give, devise and bequeath unto my be¬
loved wife, Muriel Abbott Andrews, all the rest, residue
and remainder of my estate, both real and personal.
(B) I make no bequest to my daughter, Margaret An¬
drews Belmont, her heirs, successors or assigns oif to any
children which may be born to me in lawful wedlock in the
future or their heirs, successors or assigns as they have
been provided for otherwise.
Third. I nominate, constitute and appoint the said Muriel
Abbott Andrews to be the Sole Executris of this, jny last
will and testament, and hereby provide that she be
45 required to furnish no bond or other security in the
premises.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand ^rid seal
the 17 dav of August, 1930. I
(Signed) " PAUL A. ANDREWS.
Witnesses: j
(Signed) JOHN W. HEATH.
(Signed) FRANCIS HAMILTON.
Signed, sealed, published and declared to be Ids last will
and testament in the presence of us, who, at his Request
and in his presence and in the presence of each oth^r have
hereunto subscribed our names as witnesses the ddy and
vear above written.
*
i
Ansicer and Return of Margaret Andrews Belmont.
Filed Oct. 15, 1932.
*******
Now comes respondent, Margaret Andrews Belmont, and
for answer to the supplemental petition of the Tiiustees
36
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
filed in this cause on August 15, 1932, and as a return to
the rule to show cause issued thereon, shows as follows:
1. This respondent admits, for the purpose of this pro¬
ceeding, all of the allegations contained in paragraph One
(1) of the said supplemental petition, but respectfully re¬
fers to the decree herein of January 19, 1932, for greater
accuracy as to what is contained therein.
90
2. This respondent admits, for the purpose of this pro¬
ceeding, all of the allegations contained in paragraph Two
(2) of the said supplemental petition, but respect-
46 fully refers to the petition and report of the Trustees
filed herein April 8, 1932, for greater accuracy as to
what is contained therein.
3. Answering paragraph Three (3) of said supplemental
petition, this respondent admits that pursuant to para¬
graph III of the decree of January 19, 1932, there was paid
to Paul A. Andrews on or about February 17, 1932, the
sum of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000), and a further pay¬
ment of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000) on or about May
17, 1932. This respondent being without information or
knowledge respecting the other allegations of said para¬
graph 3, neither admits nor denies the same.
4. This respondent answering paragraph Four (4) of
said supplemental petition, admits that on or about the
27th day of May, 1932, Paul A. Andrews died leaving a
paper writing termed a last wfill and testament dated Au¬
gust 17, 1930, a copy whereof is annexed to the supple¬
mental petition and marked Exhibit “A”. But having no
information or knowledge regarding the other allegations
of said paragraph Four (4), this respondent neither ad¬
mits nor denies the same.
5. This respondent answering the allegations of para¬
graph Five (5) of said supplemental petition, admits all
of the allegations thereof excepting those contained in the
second paragraph relating to the claim of Muriel Abbott
Andrews as Executrix of the estate of Paul A. Andrews,
deceased, to the quarterly instalments of income to be dis¬
tributed under the third paragraph of the decree of Jan¬
uary 19, 1932, to which said Paul A. Andrews would have
been entitled if living, and says with respect to those alle-
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
37
gations that she does not have sufficient information or
knowledge either to admit or deny the sam^.
47 Further answering said paragraph Five (!j)) of the
suplemental petition, this respondent admits as being
correct the provisions of the will of Frank W. Andrews,
deceased, set forth and quoted in said paragraph Five (5)
of the supplemental petition, but for greater accujracy re¬
fers to the will itself as duly admitted to probate and record
by this Honorable Court, holding Probate Court in admin¬
istration proceedings.
6. With reference to the allegations and statements set
forth in paragraph Six ((5) of said supplemental petition,
this respondent is advised by counsel that she is not re¬
quired to make answer to the same.
Further answering said supplemental petition and the
rule to show cause issued thereon, this respondent says that
she is the only child of Paul A. Andrews, deceased, and by
virtue thereof upon his death she became entitled under
the will of said Frank W. Andrews, as appears from the
record herein, to one-half of all income accrued in i;he said
Estate not actually paid over and distributed to her father,
said Paul A. Andrews, during his lifetime, including one-
half of the fund referred to in the said supplemental pe¬
tition as the fund ordered by this Honorable Coutt to be
restored to the Income Account, the share thereof payable
to her amounting to, to-wit, $14,491.03.
And having fully answered, this respondent pr^ys that
a further decree may be entered herein ordering and in¬
structing Petitioners, Trustees under the will of Frank W.
Andrews, deceased, to pay over to her the said feum of
$14,491.03, as well as other income accrued in favor of her
father, said Paul A. Andrews, in his lifetime, but not actu¬
ally paid over and distributed to him prior to his death;
and that she be hence dismissed with her reasonable
48 costs
MARGARET ANDREWS BELMONT.
I
FROST, MYERS & TOWERS,
By FRANK H. MYERS,
Attorneys for Respondent
Margaret Andrews Belmont.
38
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
State of New York,
Comity of New York, ss:
Margaret Andrews Belmont, being first duly sworn, on
oath deposes and says that she has read the foregoing an¬
swer and return by her subscribed and knows the contents
thereof; that the matters and things therein stated are
true, and those stated upon information and belief she be¬
lieves to be true.
MARGARET ANDREWS BELMONT.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of Oc¬
tober, A. D.1932.
[notarial seal.] HARRY J. DIETRICH,
, Notary Public , Westchester County.
Cert, filed N. Y. County No. 14.
N. Y. Countv Register No. 4D7.
Commission expires March 30, 1934.
Last Will of Frank W. Andrews.
Filed Jun. 27, 1933.
Be it remembered, that I, Frank W. Andrews, of Middle-
town, in the State of Rhode Island and Providence Planta¬
tions, do make mv last will thus, hereby revoking all
fromer will- bv me at anv time made:
First. I hereby direct my executors to pay to the Pro¬
prietors of tlie Cemetery of Mount Auburn in Cambridge,
in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts such sum of money
as mav be found necessary to obtain from said cor-
49 poration a contract for the perpetual repair with
guaranty of my lot numbered 3755 on the way called
“Clematis” in said Cemeterv including the care of the
monument and headstones on and curbing around said lot,
but not including the renewal thereof;
Second. And 1 hereby authorize and empower my execu¬
tors to rc-convey my said lot in trust, to the Proprietors of
the Cemetery of Mount Auburn, in consideration of the
contract of perpetual repair for the purpose of securing it
as a burial place for myself, my wife and my sons and
their wives and mv sons’ children; for mv sister, Elizabeth
W. Clark and her issue and their husbands and wives and
no other interments to be allowed therein;
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
39
fiving at
and be¬
st living
Third. I give and bequeath to my son, Walter S. An¬
drews, if he shall survive me, my watch and seal until my
grandson, Frank W. Andrews 2nd, shall arrive at the age
of twenty one years, and then I give and bequeath the said
watch and seal to my said grandson:
If the said Walter shall die before mv said grandson
arrives at the age of twenty one years, then upon the hap¬
pening of that event, or, upon the death of the said Wal¬
ter in mv life-time, I give the said watch and segl to the
Trustees then acting under this will or to the persons who
last acted as Trustees under this will to hold until my said
grandson arrives at the age of twenty-one years, or dies,
which ever event shall first occur, and if and when mv said
grandson arrives at the age of twenty one years to deliver
said watch and seal to my said grandson which shall then
become his absolute property:
If mv said grandson shall die before aril
50 the age of twenty-one years, I then give
queath the said watch and seal to my then oldej
male issue:
Fourth. I give and devise to my said wife, Marik F. An¬
drews, if she survives me, the parcel of land in Boston in
the County of Suffolk and Commonwealth of Massachu¬
setts with the dwelling house thereon, now numbered 187
on Beacon Street to have and to hold the same to her and
her heirs and assigns forever:
Fifth. I give, devise and bequeath to my wife, Maria F.
Andrews, for and during the term of her natural life, the
use and income of all the rest and residue of my estate, real
and personal, wheresoever the same may be sitfiate and
whensoever acquired by me, of which I shall die seized and
possessed, or in which I may have any interest, llegal or
equitable, and to which I shall be in any way entitled at
the time of mv decease, and over which I now or nkav then
have any power of appointment; and I direct that|said in¬
come shall not be alienable by my said wife, nor sjhall the
same be liable for her debts, nor shall she have y^ower to
sell, mortgage or otherwise alienate her life |interest
therein. I further direct that out of said income mv said
wife shall pay and discharge all municipal claims and all
lawful taxes, general and special, made, levied or Assessed
against any of my said real estate, the interest on kny and
all debts secured by any lien upon any of my skid real
40
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
estate, the cost of maintaining proper insurance upon the
improvements on said real estate against loss by fire, in¬
cluding boiler insurance, and the expense of keeping said
improvements in a good state of repair:
51 Sixth. At the decease of my said wife or at my de¬
cease, if I shall survive her
A. I give the use of all mv familv portraits, coats of
B H
arms and family bibles and silver tankard mark 0 to my
then oldest living son, during his life, and at his death I
give the same to his then oldest living son, but if he shall
leave no son surviving him, I give the same to my then
oldest living male descendant: and I direct that all the
rest of my furniture, linen, plate silver, bronzes, bric-a-
brac, china, glass, books, prints, pictures, wines, liquors,
fuel, consumable provisions and other household effects and
jewelry, except the watch and seal herinbefore bequeathed,
also all my brasses, live-stock, carriages, harnesses and
other appendages belonging thereto; also all gardening im¬
plements, stock of hay, corn and straw and other movable
effects which shall be used in or about my stable or grounds
at the time of my decease be appraised and then offered
at private auction to my two sons and to the issue of any
son who has then deceased and the balance of said articles
which are not sold to either of mv said sons or to the issue
of any deceased son are to be sold and all the proceeds de¬
rived from the sale of said articles whether at the said
private sale or otherwise, are to become a part of the
residue of mv estate.
V
b. All the rest, residue and remainder of my herein¬
before described estate, I give, devise and bequeath in fee-
simple and absolutely, according to the nature of the prop¬
erty, to my two sons, Paul A. Andrews of Newport, Rhode
Island and Walter S. Andrews, of Middletown, in the State
of Rhode Island, and to Oscar Luckett, of Washing-
52 ton in the District of Columbia, in trust nevertheless,
and to and for the following uses, intents and pur¬
poses viz: To hold, manage and direct the same during the
lives of my sajd two sons and the life of the survivor or
longest liver of them, and upon the death of the survivor
or longest liver of my said two sons, my Trustees shall
convey in fee-simple transfer and pay over said trust prop¬
erty as it shall then exist and free of any trust or condi-
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
41
tion to my lawful issue then living, they taking by repre¬
sentation, according to the stocks; provided, however, that
if upon the decease of the survivor or longest livet of my
said two sons, there shall be no lawful issue of mine then
living my trustees shall then convey in fee-simple, transfer
and pay over said trust property as it shall then e^ist, and
free of any trust or condition, to those persons whb are at
that time my heirs by blood, and my trustees shall dispose
of the net/ rents and income of said trust property arising
before the conveyance just directed, as follows: Th\*y shall
pay the said net/ rents and income during the continuance
of this trust by equal quarter yearly payments in every
year in equal shares to such of my said two sons jas may
be living at the time of payment and to the lawful issue
then living of either of my said two sons who has then de¬
ceased (whether such my son have died before or after
me) such issue taking by representation according to the
stocks the share which such my deceased son would have
taken if living. |
I have given no part of my said residuary estate free of
trust to my children, for the reason that they will bel amply
provided for from the fund coming to them under ijhe will
of my father, William T. Andrews:
Seventh. I hereby authorize and empower the
53 trustees or trustee for the time being under this will,
in their or his discretion to sell at public auction or
private seal, or lease, any portion or the whole of my es¬
tate, real and personal, which they or he may hold under
the trust created by this, will, and to execute and deliver
good and sufficient deeds and other instruments to convey
and transfer the same. And wherever it shall become
necessary to make the final distribution of any property
held in trust under this will, the trustees or trustee ffor the
time being shall have like authority for the purpose df such
distribution to sell and convert into money the whole or
any portion of such property, whether real or personal;
and I direct my trustees to re-invest the proceeds qf any
real estate sold, in other productive real estate.
Eighth. In case the number of Trustees under the residu¬
ary clause of this will shall be at any time reduced to two
I then direct the surviving or remaining trustees fir the
time being by any instrument or petition to nominate a
suitable person to be appointed by the Judge of Probate
42
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
for the time being having jurisdiction of this will or other
court having the necessary jurisdiction in the premises,
such trustee in the place of the trustee dying, resigning or
ceasing or refusing for any cause to act; and in defaulf of
such nomination and appointment the vacancy shall be
filled in tlie manner provided by law:
Ninth. I hereby authorize and empower my executors or
executor or the administrator with this will annexed, if in
performance! of the duties of the trust it becomes in their
or his opinion necessary or expedient to sell at any time
at public or private sale any part or all of my estate, real
or personal and to execute and deliver proper and sufficient
deeds and instruments to convev and transfer the same;
and I further authorize and empower my said executors,
executor or administrator to adjust by arbitration
54 or compromise any demands in favor of or against
my estate upon such terms as to them shall seem
best and their decision shall be final.
The wordsi “Trustees” or “Trustee” whereaver used in
this will shall be construed and taken to mean the Trustees
or Trustee for the time being whether original or substi-
tuted; and the words “child”, “children” and “issue” shall
be construed and taken to mean child, children and issue by
blood and not by adoption.
Tenth: I direct that the income herein bequeathed shall
not be alienable bv anv beneficiarv either bv assignment or
bv anv other method and the said income shall not be sub-
* »
ject to be taken by his or her creditors by any process what¬
ever :
Eleventh: I appoint my said wife, Maria F. Andrews and
my said sons, Paul A. Andrews and Walter S. Andrews, and
the said Oscar Luckett, Executors of this mv will and I
request that they and each of them be exempt from giving
anv bond, or bonds, anv suretv or sureties on their bonds
both as Executors hereof and Trustees hereunder:
Twelfth: If anv Executor or trustee herein named de-
mt
dines to accept or for any reason fails or ceases to act as
such, it shall not deprive him or her of any legacy or device
herein or bv anv codiciul given to him or her or for his or
her benefit:
Thirteenth: The decision of my trustees as to any ques¬
tion arising between capital and income shall be final and
binding on all persons then or thereafter interested:
43
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. j
I
The provisions hereinbefore made for my said wife are
in lieu of all rights of dower or other interest ip my said
estate:
Fourteenth: I direct my Executors to p^y the ex-
55 pcnse of the distribution of the furniture other
like articles out of the residue of my estate!:
Fifteenth: I hereby expressly relieve any purchaser or
purchasers at any sale made by the Trustees or Executors
under this my will from any and all obligation of feeing to
the proper application of the purchase money arising from
any such sale;
In witness whereof, I, the said Frank W. Andrews, hereto
set my hand and seal to this my will written on sev^n pages
and this portion of an eighth page, this twenty-fifth day
of September, nineteen hundred and two.
FRANK W. ANDREWS, (seal).
Signed, Sealed, Published and Declared by tlie above
named Frank W. Andrews, as and for his last will in our
presence, who at his request, in his presence, and in the
presence of each other have hereunto subscribed our names
as witnesses.
ADDISON THOMAS,
Neivporti R. I.
MARY E. WARDWELfj,
Newport, R. I.
AUSTIN FLINT, Jr.,
34 East 54 th St., New York, N. Y.
Memorandum of Court.
Filed January 10, 1933
*******
The Court will enter an order directing the trustees of
the estate of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, to pay ^nd dis¬
tribute quarterly that part of the fund referred to in the
third paragraph of the decree entered herein on the 19th
day of January, 1932, and to which Paul A. Andrejvs, now
deceased, would have been entitled to if living, to his
56 daughter, Margaret Andrews Belmont. Counsel will
please prepare proper decree.
0. R. LUHRINGj,
Justice.
44
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
Petition of Muriel Abbott Andrews, for a Rehearing.
Filed Januarv 19, 1933.
7
**•**•#
Now conies the petitioner, by her attorneys, Minor, Gatley
& Drury, and moves the Court to grant a rehearing on the
plaintiffs' supplemental petition and the rule to show cause
issued^ thereon because the finding by the Court in favor of
respondent, Margaret Andrews Belmont, as shown by the
memorandum of the Court filed herein, is not in accordance
with the decree of this Court, passed herein on Januarv 19,
1932.
MINOR, GATLEY & DRURY,
By BENJ. S. MINOR,
Attorneys for Petitioner.
Memorandum in Support of Petition for a Rehearing.
With the exception of showing the source from which the
two sons of the testator derived title to the various sums,
aggregating $32,982.06, taken with their consent from in¬
come and used for capital expenditures, tlie decision of the
Court on the question herein involved is neither dependent
upon nor requires the construction of the will of the de¬
cedent, Frank W. Andrews; but solely upon the record
herein on January 19, 1932.
In the findings of fact bv the Court from the record in
this cause, the Court, among other things, found that the
aggregate sum of $32,982.06 had, from time to time,
57 been taken in prior years from the income of the trust
estate and used for capital expenditures.
The various sums aggregating the sum of $32,982.06 so
taken from income, were taken, with the consent of the bene¬
ficiaries then entitled thereto, in various years prior to the
year in which the original bill in this cause was filed. And
at the time or times when said income was so taken for capi-
tal expenditures, and also at the date of the passage herein
of the decree of January 19, 1932, Paul A. Andrews (now
deceased), was one of the two life beneficiaries then entitled
under sub-paragraph B of the last will and testament of
Frank W. Andrews, deceased, to one-half of the net income
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
45
arising from the trust estate therein and thereby created,
payable in the manner therein directed, including one-half
of that part of the aggregate sum of $32,982.06 so taken
from accrued income and used for capital expenditures.
Under said sub-paragraph B of paragraph Sixtfi of said
last will and testament of Frank W Andrews, decelased, the
trustees are directed by the testator to pay, during the con¬
tinuance of the trust therein created, the net rentals and
income therefrom, “by equal quarter yearly payments in
every year in equal shares to such of my said two sons as
may be living at the time of payment and to the lavjful issue
then living of either of my said two sons who has (then de¬
ceased, etc.”
It is respectfully submitted that the foregoing quoted
language is clear, unambiguous and requires no construc¬
tion. It directs the trustees in clear and unambiguous lan¬
guage to pay in every year in equal shares to his two sons,
during the continuance of the trust, the income arising
therefrom by equal quarter yearly payments.
From said quoted provision of said will it is equally clear
that the lawful issue of either deceased son of the
58 testator was to receive the income accruing i|rom the
trust estate after the death of such son, ijicluding
only such of the equal quarter yearly installments of the an¬
nual income accruing during the year of and before the
death of such son but not payable until after his depth; and
not to income which had accrued and was payable in prior
years.
There is no language contained in the will which can be
construed to give to the trustees, either directly pr indi¬
rectly, the power to accumulate the income annually accru¬
ing from the trust estate, or any part thereof; or any power
to use the income or any part thereof for capital Expendi¬
tures. The specific direction of the testator is that] the in¬
come accruing from the trust estate should be paid over and
distributed in every year by equal quarterly installments .
Therefore, at the end of each fiscal or calendar year in
the administration of the trust estate, the then beneficiaries
were entitled to receive the net income which had Accrued
during such year from the trust estate. For defaullf by the
trustees in the payment and distribution thereof in accord¬
ance with said provisions of said will, the then beneficiaries
could have maintained a suit for the recovery thereof. By
46
Mj A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
consenting from time to time to the use of a part of such
income for capital expenditures, such beneficiaries did not
thereby relinquish or extinguish their title thereto. On the
contrary, we respectfully submit, such beneficiaries being
entitled to have paid over to them the income so used for
capital expenditures, became creditors of the trust estate
to the extent of the sum or sums so taken from the income
for that purpose.
The decree passed in this cause on January 19, 1932,
found from the evidence adduced that the sum of $32,982.06
was taken from the income of the estate and used for capi¬
tal expenditures, and by paragraph III thereof au-
59 thorized and directed the trustees to reimburse and
restore said amount to income; and, when so re¬
stored, to distribute the same to the life tenants entitled
thereto, in quarterly installments of One Thousand Dollars
($1,000) to each beneficiary—obviously meaning and intend¬
ing thereby the life tenants who were entitled to receive and
have paid to them the accrued income from the trust estate
at the time the same was so taken bv the trustees and used
for capital expenditures.
The fact that the decree directs the payment of the re¬
stored income “in quarterly installments of One Thousand
Dollars ($1,000) to each beneficiary”, is immaterial since
the total sum directed to be restored to income is also
directed to be paid to the life tenants entitled thereto.
The payment thereof in quarterly installments of One
Thousand Dollars ($1,000) was due to the fact, as shown
bv the record in this cause and bv said decree, that the
trustees were not in position because of lack of funds to
make immediate payment thereof in one sum. Had they
been, we respectfully submit, the decree would not have
provided for installment payments thereof.
The decree of January 19, 1932, constitutes an adjudica¬
tion bv the Court of an indebtedness bv the trustees to the
♦ *
then life tenants growing out of the use by the trustees of
income theretofore coming into their hands and used by
them for capital expenditures. Ordinarily such adjudica¬
tion would have made that sum then payable to the life ten¬
ants according to their respective interests; but, for the
purposes of administration and in the interest of the estate,
instead of the decree directing it to be paid at once in a
lump sum it directed the payment in installments as pro¬
vided in the decree. So that upon the death of Paul A.
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
47
Andrews, one of the life tenants, there was ^till pay-
60 able to him a balance of the sum so adjudicated to be
due him by the Court in its decree. Such debt due
and payable to him became and is an asset of his estate pay¬
able to his personal representatives.
MINOR, GATLEY & DRURY,
By BENJ. S. MINOR,
Attorneys for Petiiioner.
Answer of Walter S. Andrews, Reginald S. Huidekoper and
Morgan Belmont, Trustees, to Petition for Rehegring.
Filed January 24, 1933.
*
!*
Now comes Walter S. Andrews, Reginald S. Huidekoper
and Morgan Belmont, Trustee and Substituted trustees
under the Will of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, py their
attorney, Reginald S. Huidekoper, and for answer to the
Petition for a Rehearing tiled herein, on to wit, January 19,
1933, by Margaret Abbott Andrews, Executrix under the
Will of Paul A. Andrews, deceased, prays that the Court
will deny said Petition for a Rehearing, and enter its De¬
cree herein, for the reasons, amongst others, set opt in the
Memorandum attached hereto and prayed to be t*ead as
part hereof.
REGINALD S. HUIDEKOPER,
Attorney for the Trustees.
61
i
Answer of Margaret Andrews Belmont to petition
for Rehearing.
Filed January 24, 1933.
L
Comes now Margaret Andrews Belmont, by her
neys, and for answer to the Petition for a Rehearing filed
herein by Margaret Abbott Andrews, Executrix under the
Will of Paul A. Andrews, deceased, says that such petition
should be denied by the Court for the reasons stated in the
attached Memorandum.
FROST, MYERS, & TOWERS,
Attorneys for Margaret Andrews Belinont.
attor-
48
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
Memorandum Opposing Petition for Rehearing.
*******
The petition for rehearing herein seeks to have this
Court consider again a matter which was fully argued by
counsel and decided by the Court after due deliberation;
and nothing is contained in the Memorandum in support of
said petition that was not argued at the oral hearing and,
perforce, considered by the Court in its study of the case.
In the first paragraph of said Memorandum it is stated
that “the question herein involved is neither dependent
upon nor requires the construction of the will of the de¬
cedent”. In other words, petitioner says that even though
the testator meant literally what he in terms said in his
will, namely, that his two sons were to have onlv such in-
come as was actually paid into their hands, that would have
nothing to do with the lawful disposition of the disputed
monies, which although accumulated and accrued during
the life of decedent, Paul W. Andrews, admittedly and cer¬
tainly were not paid over into his hand during his lifetime.
We submit that the petition contains no substantial
62 argument to support it, raises no point not raised at
the oral argument, and merely seeks to impose on
this Court tlie burden of hearing again arguments which it
has already heard and to which counsel must assume it has
given due and full consideration.
Respectfullv submitted,
FROST, MYERS & TOWERS,
Attorneys for Respondent
Margaret Andrew's Belmont.
Opinion.
Filed March 25, 1933.
*******
On the 1st day of December, 1931, the trustees herein filed
their petitiop asking the Court to construe the will of Frank
W. Andrews and to authorize and empower them to borrow
money, encumber by mortgage or deed of trust any parcels
of the real estate owned by the trust and to ratify and con¬
firm certain of their acts dealing with trust property.
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
49
a decree
s of the
Paul A. Andrews, a beneficiary of the trust, bjy his an¬
swer filed on the 14th day of December, 1931, consented to
the granting of the prayers of the petition and to
ratifying, confirming and approving all the act
trustees.
Upon consideration of this petition, my associate, Mr.
Justice Adkins, on the 19th day of January, 1932, by decree
authorized and directed the trustees, among other things,
to restore to the income account funds taken ftfom that
account and used for capital expenditures and to pay the
amount thus restored to the beneficiaries as will more par¬
ticularly appear from Paragraph III of the decree as
follows:
63 “It appearing from the evidence that the sum of
Thirty-two Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-two
Dollars and Six Cents ($32,982.06) was taken froifi the in¬
come of the estate and used for capital expenditures, the
Trustees are hereby authorized and directed to reimburse
and restore to income said amount and to make tlje neces¬
sary adjustment and charges against capital }n their
accounts to be hereafter submitted to the Court, aiid when
the said amount is restored to income, to distribute the
same to the life tenants entitled thereto, in quart
stallments of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000)
beneficiary.”
erly in¬
to each
* i
This decree also authorized the trustees to borrow the
sum of $350,000 “in such installments at such timers and at
such rates of interest as they may consider for the best
interest of the trust estate, and to secure the sam^ by the
mortgage of any and/or all of the property of the trust
estate”. The decree also approved and confirmed i;he acts
of the trustees in making “the several sales, purchases,
transfers and exchanges of various properties of tljie trust
estate and the application of the proceeds of such sales and
transfers as set forth in the evidence.”
Paul A. Andrews and Walter S. Andrews, the H 7 o sons
of the testator, are the life tenants referred to in Paragraph
III of this decree and are entitled to receive the income
thus ordered restored. The income was restored, and,
agreeably to the provisions of the decree, the trustees, on
4—6025a
50
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
the 17th days of February and May, 1932, made payments
of $1,000 to each of the two beneficiaries, or a total of
$4,000, on account of the income due them.
Paul A. Andrews, one of the sons, died testate on the
27th day of May, 1932, leaving him surviving a widow,
Muriel Abbott Andrews, who is the executrix of his will,
and a daughter, Margaret Andrews Belmont. By the terms
of his will, he devised and bequeathed all of his estate, real
and personal to the widow.
64 On the 15th day of August, 1932, the trustees filed
their supplemental petition for instructions, wherein
it is alleged that Muriel Abbott Andrews has claimed and
has asserted that when she lias qualified as executrix of the
estate of the said Paul A. Andrews, deceased, she will claim
the quarterly installments to be distributed under this third
paragraph of the January 19th decree to which the said
Paul A. Andrews would have been entitled if living; and
that Margaret Andrews Belmont, the daughter of the de¬
ceased, has claimed and does claim that under the terms
of the will of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, she alone is en¬
titled to the one-half of the fund ordered restored to income
by this decree.
The prayer is that the Court will enter its order or decree
directing the trustees to whom they shall pay and dis¬
tribute quarterly that part of the fund referred to in the
third paragraph of the decree of January 19th, 1932, to
which Paul A. Andrews would have been entitled if living
at the time further payments and distributions are to be
made.
Answers were duly filed to the petition and after a con¬
sideration of the question presented, this Court, on the
10th dav of Januarv, 1933, bv a written memorandum,
stated that a decree would be entered directing the trustees
to pay and distribute quarterly that part of the fund re¬
ferred to in the third paragraph of the decree to Margaret
Andrews Belmont. It is this ruling that is challenged by
the petition for rehearing.
The petition for rehearing was filed by Muriel Abbott
Andrews, executrix of the will of Paul A. Andrews, de¬
ceased, on the 19th day of January, 1933. The trustees and
Margaret Andrews Belmont oppose the petition, and writ¬
ten briefs in opposition have been filed by them.
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 51
The will of Frank W. Andrews, duly admitted to probate
in this Court on the 8th day of July, 1903, made pro-
65 vision for his widow, Maria F. Andrews. His widow
died on the 22d day of November, 1931, and the trust
with which we are here concerned became active oh the 1st
day of December, 1914.
It is to be noted at the outset that the will of Frank W.
Andrews, deceased, required all funds derived f^om the
sale of real estate by the trustees to be reinvested in other
productive real estate. Because of this requirenjient the
trustees of the estate have been unable to create capital
cash fund with which to meet capital obligations, |such as
payment of curtails and extensions of loans, capjtal bet¬
terments and charges. Such items were paid out of in¬
come with the consent of Paul A. Andrews and Walter S.
Andrews, the beneficiaries entitled to the net income from
the estate. (See Report of Trustees filed April $, 1932.)
Income to the extent of $32,982.06 was thus expended, as
found by the Court in its decree of January 19tlf.
The sixth paragraph of the will makes disposition of
the estate after the death of the testator’s wife, providing
with respect to the main residuary estate, that it ihall be
held in trust for his two sons, Paul A. Andrews and'Walter
S. Andrews, until the death of the survivor of th^m, and
thereafter to the lawful issue of the testator. 'Jhe net
rents and income of the trust property are disposed of in
subdivision b of this paragraph of the will to the t\ko sons
as follows:
“My trustees shall dispose of the net rents and income of
said trust property arising before the conveyance just di¬
rected, as follows: They shall pay the said net reitts and
income during the continuance of this trust by equall quar¬
terly payments in every year in equal shares to such of my
said two sons as may be living at the time of payment and
to the lawful issue then living if either of my said two sons
who has then deceased (whether such my son have died
before or after me) such issue taking by representation
according to the stocks the share which such my deceased
son would have taken if living . 9 ’
The tenth and thirteenth paragraphs of tfye will
66 are pertinent to the inquiry and read as follows:
5—6025a
52 M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
“ Tenth. I direct that the income here bequeathed shall
not be alienable by anv beneficiary either bv assignment
or by any other method and the said income shall not be
subject to be taken by his or her creditors by any process
whatever. ’ ’
“ Thirteenth. The decision of my trustees as to any ques¬
tion arising between capital and income shall be final and
binding on all persons then or thereafter interested/’
It is obvious that the subdivision b of the sixth para¬
graph of the will creates a trust, and, in the language of
Wilmot, C. J., “trusts are always imperative, and are ob¬
ligatory upon; the conscience of the party entrusted.” At¬
torney General v. Downing, Wilm. 23. No discretion was
vested in the trustees. It was imperatively required that
“they shall pay the net rents and income * * * by
equal quarterly payments in every year in equal shares to
such of my two sons as may be living at the time of pay¬
ment.” Income became due and payable during the life
of the sons, and with their consent it was not paid in the
manner directed, but was from time to time, with like con¬
sent of the sons, applied to capital expenditures. In other
words, the trustees had the power to borrow money from
any source for the purposes of the trust but they did not
go through the idle form and ceremony of passing the
actual cash to these beneficiaries and then receiving it from
their hands as a loan to the estate. Certainly, in this con¬
nection, the Court may regard the substance rather than
the form of the transaction.
The thirteenth paragraph of the will gave the trustees
no discretion in the matter of the payment of income once
ascertained to be such. The record fails to disclose anv
question arising between capital and income, requiring the
decision of the trustees, and if there was such question it
was resolved in favor of income. This Court, bv its decree
of Januarv 19th, so treats it and so orders it distributed
to the beneficiaries.
67 The supplemental petition of the trustees for in¬
structions, filed on the 15th day of August, 1932,
advises the Court that the trustees had arranged to borrow’
“such amounts as they might require to meet the obliga¬
tions of said estate, and to restore to income from capital
for distribution quarterly such amounts up to an amount
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 53
fixed, as they should require pursuant to the said ^lecree of
January 19th, 1932,” and in paragraph three of such peti¬
tion it is alleged that “the first $10,000 was borrowed as
aforesaid on February 17, 1932, and of this amount $2,000
was restored to income and $1,000 was distributed on said
date to the said Paul A. Andrews and $1,000 to the said
Walter S. Andrews pursuant to the said decree of {January
19th, 1932.” It is alleged that “a further sum cj>f $2,000
was restored to income and distributed to the salid bene¬
ficiaries at the next quarter, viz., an May 17th, lt}32, pur¬
suant to the said decree.”
As the net rents and income accrued, the trustees were
required to pay it to the beneficiaries quarterly each year.
Equity looks upon that as done which ought to be done.
“For the purpose of reaching exact justice, equity (will fre¬
quently consider that property has assumed certain forms
with which it ought, in justice, to be stamped, or that parties
have performed certain duties which they ought, in justice,
to fulfill; and will regulate the enjoyment and transmis¬
sion of estates and interests accordingly.” Bispham’s
Equity (5th Ed.) 70-71. Viewed in the light of this maxim,
the income was paid to the beneficiaries at the time it ought
to have been paid, and became their property wholly apart
from the trust. They were free to loan it to the trust.
The tenth item of the will prohibited the assignment of
the income by the beneficiaries and also prevented their
creditors from taking it by any process whatever. This
item did not deny the present enjoyment of the in-
68 come bv the beneficiaries. Before it was earned, the
beneficiaries could make no valid assignment of the
income, nor could their creditors by attachment or execu¬
tion levy upon it. The income could not be diverted from
its object. Nichols v. Platon, 91 U. S. 716; Spindle v.
Shreve, 111 U. S. 542; Broadway National Bank v. Adams,
133 Mass. 170; Pope’s Plxecutors v. Elliott, 8 B. Monroe
(Ky.) 56. The will of Paul A. Andrews, deceased, does not
attempt to dispose of any of the trust estate, and it will
not be contended in this connection that he did net have
the right by will to dispose of the income paid to him in
February and May, 1932, or any debt or obligation |due or
owing to him at the time of his death.
It is urged in the brief of the trustees that the construc¬
tion of the decree of January 19th contended for py the
54
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
executrix would defeat the manifest intention of the testa¬
tor, Frank W. Andrews, in that it would extend the
trust bevond the date fixed for its termination. The Court
in its decree of January 19th ordered the amount due these
•/
beneficiaries to be paid to them quarterly and in stated
amounts. It had the power then to order and direct the
immediate payment of the whole amount found to be due
and even now mav modify its decree accordingly.
Nor does the doctrine of estoppel urged by the trustees
apply. The widow and executrix in asserting her claim
does not repudiate the acts of Paul A. Andrews. So far
as the record discloses, he regarded the sums so expended
by the trustees as income properly belonging to him, other¬
wise there was no necessity for his consent to the ex-
penditures.
Finally let it be understood that the determination of
* <
the question here presented involves no criticism of the
trustees in the management of this trust. On the contrary,
thev are to be commended.
69 Therefore, after careful reconsideration, I am of
the opinion that the balance due on account of the
restored income is payable to the estate of Paul A. An¬
drews, deceased, in the same manner as it would be payable
to him if living.
It is so ordered and counsel will prepare decree.
0. R. LUHRING,
Justice.
Decree Instructing Trustees.
Filed April 14, 1933.
* * # # # # *
This cause jcoming on to be heard upon the supplemental
petition of Walter S. Andrews, Reginald S. Huidekoper and
Morgan Belmont, Trustees under the Will of Frank W.
Andrews, deceased, filed herein on August 15, 193*2, the rule
to show cause issued thereon and the answer and return
thereto of Muriel Abbott Andrews, executrix of the estate
of Paul A. Andrews, deceased, and Margaret Andrews
Belmont, and the same having been fully argued by counsel
and considered by the Court, it is this 14th day of April,
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. 55
1933, by the Court, adjudged, ordered and decreed as
follows:
1. That by paragraph III of the decree, passed herein
on January 19, 1932, Paul A. Andrews (now deceased) be¬
came vested with the right, title and interest, and entitled
to receive from the trustees of the estate of Frame W. An¬
drews, deceased, in the manner and at the times set forth
in said decree, one-half of the sum of $32,982.06, being the
amount taken from income in prior years by the| trustees
of the trust estate created by the last will and testament
of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, with the consent of the
beneficiaries entitled thereto, and used for capital
70 expenditures; and upon the death of the said Paul
A. Andrews, the unpaid balance of said on!e-half of
the said sum of $32,982.06, amounting to $14,491.0$, passed
to, became vested in and payable to his estate in :he same
manner and at the times as directed by said decree of Janu¬
ary 19 1932.
* 7
2. That out of the said unpaid balance of $14,491.03, and
as and when the same is restored to income in accordance
with the provisions of the said decree of January j.9, 1932,
the said petitioners, Walter S. Andrews, Reginald S.
Huidekoper and Morgan Belmont, trustees of the Estate
of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, and their successors in
trust, are hereby instructed and directed to pay over and
distribute to Muriel Abbott Andrews, executrix of the
Estate of Paul A. Andrews, deceased, and to her successor
representative of said estate, the quarterly installments
which have heretofore accrued and become payable under
and in accordance with the terms and provisions qf Para¬
graph III of the said Decree of January 19, 1932; and out
of the balance of the remaining half of said fund, and as
and when the same is restored to income, the said Trus¬
tees and their successors in trust, shall pay and distribute
to the said Executrix, and to her successor representative
as aforesaid, the quarterly installments hereafter to be¬
come due and payable in accordance with the ter^ns and
conditions of said paragraph of said decree, and which
the said Paul A. Andrews would have been entitled to re¬
ceive had he lived.
3. That jurisdiction of this cause is hereby retailed for
such further instructions, orders and decrees as the Trus-
56
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
tees or any other party to this cause may deem necessary,
or the necessities of the case may require.
Bv the Court:
0. R. LUHRING,
Justice.
71 No objection as to form; but we reserve exception
to entrance of this decree upon the ground that there
is nothing before the court upon which a decree can be
founded, the i last pleading being a motion for leave to
re-argue.
NORMAN B. FROST,
Attorney for Margaret Andrews Belmont.
The respondent, Margaret Andrews Belmont, in open
Court, excepts to the signing of the foregoing decree and
notes an appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia, which is hereby allowed, and the bond
or undertaking on appeal fixed in the sum of One Hundred
Dollars ($100), and the bond or undertaking on appeal to
act as supersedeas is hereby fixed at Four Thousand
Dollars.
Bv the Court.
0. R. LUHRING,
Justice.
Memorandum.
May 8, 1933.—Supersedeas Bond ($4,000) on appeal ap¬
proved and filed.
Assignments of Error.
Filed May 12,1933.
• •••••*
Comes now Margaret Andrews Belmont, appellant in the
above-entitled cause, by her attorneys, and files this Assign¬
ment of the Errors upon which she will reply in the prose¬
cution of her appeal from the decree entered herein the
14th day of April, 1933.
The Court erred as follows, to wit:
1. In reversing its decision of January 10th, 1933,
72 wherein the accumulated interest fund in question
was awarded to Margaret Andrew’s Belmont and
entering the Decree of April 14th, 1933.
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
57
2. In acting finally upon Muriel Abbott Andrew’s petition
for a rehearing, without affording appellant an^ oppor¬
tunity to be heard thereon, and in entering a final decree
reversing a previous order upon a petition which requested
a rehearing only.
3. In holding that the will of Frank W. Andrews author¬
ized and required the Trustees thereunder, by paragraph 6
thereof, to pay over accrued income to persons other than
the two sons of testator therein mentioned and their issue.
4. In construing the will of Frank W. Andrews as an
entirety to provide that income accrued during th(^ life of
either of the beneficiaries thereunder, Paul A. Andrews and
Walter S. Andrews, became their property prior t!o being
actually paid over to them, and in thus holding flhat the
Executrix of the Estate of Paul A. Andrews was entitled to
certain income accrued during his lifetime but not actually
paid over to him or specifically set aside for his benefit, as
against the claim of the issue of said Paul A. Andrews.
5. In failing to grant to appellant, Margaret Andrews
Belmont, the relief prayed by her Answer filed in the pro¬
ceedings below.
6. And for other errors appearing upon the facq of the
record herein.
FROST, MYERS & TOWERS,
Attorneys for Appellant.
I
Service of a copy of the above Assignment of
73 Errors acknowledged this 12th dav of Mav, 1933.
MINOR, GATLEY & DRURY,
Attorneys for Muriel Abbott Andrews ,
Executrix under the Will of Paul A. Andrews.
REGINALD S. HUIDEKOPER,
Attorney for Trustees, Walter S. Andrews\
Reginald S. Huidekoper and Morgan Belmont.
Designation of Record.
Filed May 12,1933.
*******
Comes now appellant, Margaret Andrews Belmqnt, by
her attorneys of record, and designates the following for
inclusion in the transcript of record on appeal in the above-
entitled cause:
58
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL.
1. Petition to construe will and instruct trustees, filed in
this cause December 1, 1931.
2. Decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Colum¬
bia, January 19, 1932.
3. Petition and report of Trustees, stating account from
December 1, 1914, to April 1, 1932.
4. Decree of May 26, 1932.
5. Supplemental petition of Trustees filed August 15,
1932, with Exhibit “A” thereto.
6. Answer and return of Margaret Andrews Belmont,
filed October 15, 1932, to above petition.
7. Will of Frank W. Andrews.
8. Memorandum of Mr. Justice Luhring of January 10,
1933, ordering Trustees to pay accumulated interest fund
to Margaret Andrews Belmont.
9. Petition of Muriel Abbott Andrews, Executrix under
the will of Paul A. Andrews, Deceased, for a rehearing.
10. Answer of Walter S. Andrews, Reginald S.
74 Huidekoper and Morgan Belmont, Trustees, to peti¬
tion for rehearing..
11. Answer of Margaret Andrew’s Belmont to Petition
for Rehearing.
12. Opinion of Mr. Justice Luhring, entered on the Peti¬
tion for Rehearing, reversing former order and directing
payment of accumulated fund to the Estate of Paul A.
Andrew’s.
13. Decree entered April 14, 1933, with note of appeal
thereon, and not refixing supersedeas bond of $4,000.
14. Note. of filing of supersedeas bond by respondent,
Margaret Andrews Belmont.
15. The assignments of error.
16. This Designation.
MARGARET ANDREWS BELMONT,
By FROST, MYERS & TOWERS,
Her Attorneys of Record.
Service of a copy of the above Designation of Record is
hereby acknowledged this 12th day of Mav, 1933.
MINOR, GATLEY & DRURY,
Attorneys for Muriel Abbott Andreivs,
Executrix under the will of Paul A. Andrews.
\ REGINALD S. HUIDEKOPER,
Attorney for Trustees, Walter S. Andrews,
Reginald S. Huidekoper and Morgan Belmont.
M. A. BELMONT VS. W. S. ANDREWS ET AL. |
59
75 Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
United States of America,
District of Columbia, ss:
I, Frank E. Cunningham, Clerk of the Supreme! Court of
the District of Columbia, hereby certify the foregoing pages
numbered from 1 to 74, both inclusive, to be a trub and cor¬
rect transcript of the record, according to directions of
counsel, herein filed, copy of which is made part of this
transcript, in cause No. 53738 in Equity, wherein ^Valter S.
Andrews et al. are Petitioners and Frank W. Andrews et al.
are Defendants, as the same remains upon the files and of
record in said Court.
In testimony whereof, I hereunto subscribe my ifame and
affix the seal of said Court, at the City of Washington, in
said District, this 17th day of July, 1933.
[Seal Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.]
FRANK E. CUNNINGHAk,
j Clerk.
i
Endorsed on cover: District of Columbia Supreme Court.
No. 6025. Margaret Andrews Belmont, appellant, jvs. Wal¬
ter S. Andrews et al. Court of Appeals, District of Colum¬
bia. Filed Jul. 18, 1933. Henry W. Hodges, Cle|*k.
Addition to Record per Stipulation of Counsel
IN THE
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
No. 6025
MARGARET ANDREWS BELMONT, APPELLANT,
I
VS.
WALTER S. ANDREWS ET AL., APPELL
Stipulation as to Filing Copy of Answer and Return of
Muriel Abbott Andrews, Executrix.
It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and betweeii counsel
for the parties to the above entitled appeal that thi answer
and return of Muriel Abbott Andrews, executrix of the
estate of Paul A. Andrews, deceased, to the supplemental
petition of the trustees filed in this cause on August |15,1932,
a copy of which is hereto attached, may be filed, printed and
constitute a part of the record on appeal herein.
FROST, MYERS & |
TOWERS,
By NORMAN FROST, |
Attorneys for Appellant,
Margaret Andrews Belmont .
MINOR, GATLEY &
DRURY,
Attorneys for Appellee,
Muriel Abbott Andrew
Executrix of the Eslate
of Paul A . Andrews, j^ec’d.
o
Filed Oct. 6,1932.
In the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, Holding
an Equity Court.
Equity. No. 53738.
Walter S. Andrews et al., Petitioners,
vs.
Frank W. Andrews et al., Defendants.
Answer and Return of Muriel Abbott Andrew's , Executrix
of the Estate of Paul A. Andrews , Deceased.
This respondent, in answer to the supplemental petition
of the trustees filed in this cause on August 15, 1932, and as
return to the rule to show cause issued thereon, says:
1. She admits for the purposes of this proceeding the
allegations contained in paragraph 1 of said supplemental
petition; but for greater accuracy refers to the decree itself,
passed in this cause on January 19,1932, with respect to the
provisions thereof.
2. Respondent admits for the purposes of this proceeding
the allegations contained in paragraph 2 of said supple¬
mental petition; but for greater accuracy refers to the peti¬
tion and report of the trustees filed herein on April 8, 1932,
and to the decree in said paragraph referred to, with respect
to the contents thereof.
3. In answer to paragraph 3 of said supplemental peti¬
tion this respondent admits that, pursuant to paragraph III
of the decree passed herein on January 19, 1932, there was
paid by the trustees to Paul A. Andrews the sum of $1,000
on or about February 17, 1932, and a like sum on or about
May 17, 1932. With respect to the other matters and things
alleged in said paragraph this respondent is without infor¬
mation or knowledge respecting the same.
4. This respondent admits the allegations contained in
paragraph 4 of said supplemental petition.
In connection with said paragraph this respondent files
herewith, as Exhibits 1 and 2, a certified copy of the last
will and testament of Paul Adams Andrews, which was duly
admitted to probate and record on the 15th day of Septem¬
ber, A. D. 1932, by the Probate Court in and for the County
of Suffolk, in the State of Massachusetts, and a certified
copy of letters testamentary dated September 16, 1932,
issued to respondent as the executrix named in said will, and
which are prayed to be read and considered by the Court as
a part of this paragraph.
5. In answer to paragraph 5 of said supplemental peti¬
tion this respondent admits, that pursuant to paragraph III
of the decree of January 19, 1932, the trustees were on,
to-wit, August 17, 1932, directed to restore to income the
sum of $2,000 and to distribute the same in accordance with
tlie provisions thereof.
Petitioner further admits that after the deatl} of said
Paul A. Andrews, her husband, and prior to August 17,
1932, she notified the said trustees of the provisions of the
will of tlie said Paul A. Andrews, and by reason thereof
respondent claimed and asserted, and now claims and as¬
serts, that as to one-half of the said sum of $2,000, which
the said trustees were directed by paragraph III! of sfciid
decree of January 19, 1932, to restore to capital on, to-wit,
August 17, 1932, as well as with respect to one-half of any
and all sums hereafter restored to income pursuant to said
decree of January 19, 1932, the same is distributable and
payable to petitioner as executrix of the estate of snid Paul
A. Andrews, deceased.
Further answering said paragraph this respondent for
the purposes of this proceeding admits the provisions of
the will of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, referred to and
quoted in said paragraph 5 of said supplemental petition;
was
duly admitted to probate and record by this Honorable
Court, holding a Probate Court.
As to the other matters and things referred to in said
paragraph 5 of said supplemental petition, this respondent
is without knowledge or information concerning the same.
6. As to the matters and things set forth in paragraph 6
of said supplemental petition, this respondent is advised
that she is not required to answer the same.
7. Further answering said supplemental petition pid the
rule to show cause issued thereon, this respondent sdys that
the record in this cause establishes the fact, and this Hon-
but for greater accuracy refers to the will itself which
4
orable Court £o found, that for a number of years prior to
the death of Paul A. Andrews, the trustees under the will
of Frank W. iAndrews, deceased, from time to time, took
various sums from the net income of the trust estate, one-
half of which was payable to said Paul A. Andrews, quarter-
yearly in each and every year, and used and applied said
sums for capital expenditures; and that by reason thereof
this Honorable Court on January 19, 1932, authorized and
directed the petitioners herein as trustees to reimburse and
restore to income the sum of $32,982.06 which the Court
found to have been taken from income as aforesaid, and to
distribute the same to the life tenants entitled thereto, in
quarterly installments of $1,000 to each beneficiary.
That under| sub-paragraph B of paragraph Sixth of the
said las! will and testament of Frank W. Andrews, deceased,
the testator, after the death of his wife, or at his death
should she not survive him, and after compliance with the
provisions of sub-paragraph A thereof, gave, devised and
bequeathed all the rest, residue and remainder of his estate
in trust, for the use and purposes therein stated, and, among
others, to pay the net rents and income during the contin¬
uance of the trust by equal quarterly yearly payments in
every year in equal shares to such of his said two sons, viz,
Paul A. Andrews and Walter Andrews, as mav be living at
the time of payment.
Petitioner further shows unto the Court that the record
in this cause establishes the fact that all of such sums taken
from income and used and applied for capital expenditures
were taken from the net income which had accrued from
said trust estate, and which said net income was, under the
provisions of said will of the said Frank A. Andrews, pay¬
able by equal quarterly yearly payments in every year in-
equal shares to his said tiro sons. By reason thereof such
sums so taken from income and used for capital expendi¬
tures created a debt or an obligation of the trust estate in
favor of the beneficiaries who were entitled, at the time the
same accrued,; to receive said net income in everv vear bv
equal quarterly installments; and such debt or obligation
of the trust estate passed to the estate of anv beneficiarv
thereof dying before the full payment thereof.
Further answering this respondent says that by the lan¬
guage of paragraph III of the decree passed herein on Jan-
5
nary 19, 1932, it is obvious that the Court intended that the
payments therein directed to be made to the “life tenants
'entitled thereto” were the life tenants then living, and who
were the beneficiaries entitled to said income When the
same was used and applied for capital expenditures.
Further answering said supplemental petition ! this re¬
spondent alleges that at the time of the death of siid Paul
A. Andrews, he was, pursuant to the adjudication ar|d deter¬
mination of this Court as aforesaid, entitled to receive of
and from the said trustees the sum of $14,491.03 (b^ing the
balance of his share of the net income theretofore payable
to him under the terms and provisions of the will o^ Frank
W. Andrews, deceased), used by the trustees of the estate
of said Frank W. Andrews, deceased, for capital Expendi¬
tures, which said sum is payable in accordance with the
terms and provisions of said decree of January 19, 1932;
and that upon the death of the said Paul A. Andrews the
said sum of $14,491.03 so entitled to be received by him be¬
came and now is an asset of his estate, and is payable to
this respondent as executrix under his will more particu¬
larly referred to in paragraph 4 of this answer.
And now having fully answered, this respondent prays
to be hence dismissed with her reasonable costs.
MURIEL ABBOTT ANDREWS,
Executrix of the Estate of
Paul A. Andrews, Deceased.
MINOR, GATLEY & DRURY,
By BENJ. S. MINOR,
Attorneys for Respondent,
312 Colorado Building.
State of Massachusetts,
County of Suffolk, To wit:
Muriel Abbott Andrews, being first duly sworn according
to law, upon oath deposes and says that she has read the
foregoing answer and return by her subscribed and knows
the contents thereof; that the matters and things therein
stated upon her personal knowledge are true, and those
things stated upon information and belief she belibves to
be true.
MURIEL ABBOTT ANDRE|WS.
6
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22nd day of Sep¬
tember, A. D. 1932.
[seal.] DANIEL J. TRIGGS,
Notary Public.
[Endorsed;] No. 6025. Margaret Andrews Belmont, Ap¬
pellant, vs. Walter S. Andrews et al. Addition to record per
stipulation of counsel. Court of Appeals, District of Colum¬
bia. Filed Oct. 25, 1933. Henry W. Hodges, Clerk.
(4097)
"ft KR. JJ7STT0B BOHE O
DISTRICT Or COLUMEJ/
JF A^iF£:/Y_r
A
~ ; ?
^■T 51323
j ^ ^
VfT&A/J /iT s -
/ '
CLERK
IN THE
Court of gppeate, district of Columbia
No. 6025.
Margaret Andrews Belmont,
Appellant ,
vs.
Walter S. Andrews, Reginald S. Huidekoper,
Morgan Belmont, Trustees, et al.
BRIEF ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT.
Norman B. Frost,
Frank S. Myers,
Frederic N. Towers,
Counsel for Appellant.
Psess or By eox S. Adams, Washington, D. 0.
INDEX.
Page
Question Presented. 1,2
Facts, and Proceedings Below. 2, 6
Assignment of Errors . 6, 7
Argument. 7
1. Pertinent Provisions of the Will.7,8
2. Applicable Rules of Construction.....8,14
3. Case of Lombard v. Witbeck..15,18
4. The Decree of January 19th, 1932, did not
Vest anv Interest in the Fund.18,19
5. Any Doubt should be Resolved in Favor of
Appellant. 19
Conclusion .. 20
TABLE OF CASES.
Cruit v. Owen, 25 App. D. C. 514. 13
DeVaughn v. DeVaughn, 3 App. D. C. 53. 13
Lombard v. Witbeck, 173 111. 396; 51 X. E. 61... 15
Mayo v. Weeden, 47 App. D. C. 138. 13
Sherman v. American Security & Trust Co., 57
App. D. C. 273 . 19
Wright v. Denn, 23 U. S. (10 Wheat.) 204, 239.. 13
IN THE
Court of Appeals, district of Columbia
l
i
_ !
I
No. 6025.
Margaret Andrews Belmont,
Appellant ,
vs.
Walter S. Andrews, Reginald S. Huidekoper,
Morgan Belmont, Trustees, et al.
APPELLANT’S BRIEF.
QUESTION PRESENTED.
This appeal from the lower court’s decree raises tlie
question as to whether a one-half share in certajin
funds in the hands of testamentary trustees should \)e
paid by them to the estate of a deceased life beneficiary
under a residuum clause of his will, as being mon^y
the right and title to which had vested in him during
his lifetime; or, by the terms of the instrument cre¬
ating the trust—which provides that income shall be
disbursed by quarterly payments to such of testator ’s
2
sons “as may be living at the time of payment, and to
the lawful issue then living of either of said sons who
has then deceased”—should be payable to deceased’s
beneficiary’s only daughter, apjoellant.
FACTS, AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW.
The will of Frank W. Andrews, bearing date Sep¬
tember 25th, 1902, was admitted to probate and record
in this District July 8th, 1903. Bv the terms thereof
the remainder of testator’s property was given to
his widow for life and at her death to trustees to hold,
manage, etc., until the death of the survivor of tes¬
tator’s two sons, Paul A. and Walter S. Andrews, at
which time it was to be distributed to testator’s issue.
The direction to the trustees regarding payment of
income during the life of the trust was as follows:
“They shall pay the said nett rents and income
during the continuance of this trust by equal quar¬
ter vearlv pavments in everv vear in equal shares
to such of mv said two sons as mav be living at
the time of payment and to the lawful issue then
living of either of mv said two sons who has then
deceased.”
On December 1st, 1931, the trustees filed a petition
on the equity side of the court below praying that the
will be construed, that they be authorized to borrow
monev on real estate owned bv the trust estate, and that
certain of their acts as trustees during the preceding
seventeen years be ratified and confirmed (R. p. 2).
The chief purpose of this proceeding was to ob¬
tain authority to pledge real estate for loans, but it
appeared incidentally that in order to administer the
trust, the terms of which compelled them to keep all
assets in real estate, the trustees had from time to
3
time used for capital purposes rents that properly
should have been credited on the income side of the
ledger (and at other times had disbursed capital as
income). In their annual accounts the trustees had
always fully disclosed the use of such rents, andjhad
each year obtained the written consent and approval of
such accounts from the two life beneficiaries (R. p.
22). In entering its decree upon this petition (Janu¬
ary 19, 1932; R. p. 1G) the Court by Paragraph III
thereof provided as follows:
“It appearing from the evidence that the ium
of Thirty-two Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-
two Dollars and Six Cents ($32,982.06) was talken
from the income of the estate and used for cap¬
ital expenditures, the Trustees are hereby author¬
ized and directed to reimburse and restore to in¬
come said amount and to make the necessarv ad-
justment and charges against capital in their ac¬
counts to be hereafter submitted to the Court, and
when the said amount is restored to income, to dis¬
tribute the same to the life tenants entitled there¬
to, in quarterly installments of One Thousand Dol¬
lars ($1,000) to each beneficiary.”
Ithe j
be ^
m
It will be noted that the funds ordered restored to
the income account were not to be paid out forthright
to the existing life beneficiaries, but, following
terms of the testator's will, when restored were to
distributed “to the life tenants entitled thereto,
quarterly installments” of $1,000.00.
Thereafter, on April 8th, 1932,. the trustees file<J a
“Petition and Report” wherein, after setting out that
reports had been filed by them with the Auditor annu¬
ally since April, 1915, they referred to the situation
regarding credits due the income account in the follow¬
ing language:
4
“No formal audit of these accounts was made
by the Auditor, although annually the said Paul
A. Andrews and Walter S. Andrews, as the sole
persons then entitled to the income from said es¬
tate, have approved each and every item of dis¬
bursement shown in said annual accounts, which
cover the period from December 1, 1914, to April
16,1931.
“Owing to the fact that the provisions of the
Will of the said testator required all funds derived
from the sale of real estate to be reinvested in
other productive real estate, the Trustees of this
estate have been unable to create a capital cash
fund with which to meet capital obligations, such
as payment of curtails and extensions of loans,
capital betterments and charges, and frequently
these have been paid out of income with the con¬
sent of Paul A. Andrews and Walter S. Andrews,
the beneficiaries entitled to the net income from
said estate.
“By decree entered herein on January 19, 1932,
it was directed that the sum of ^32;9S2.06, which
appeared from the evidence to have been taken
from income and used for capital expenditures,
should be restored to income and distributed to
the life beneficiaries entitled to the net income
and the said Trustees should make the necessary
adjustments and charges in their accounts to be
thereafter submitted to the Court and when the
said amount is restored to income, to distribute
the isame to the life tenants entitled thereto, in
quarterly installments of $1,000.00 to each benefi-
ciarv.”
Along with this report exhibits were filed showing
in detail all payments made during the period of the
trust by income on behalf of capital and by capital on
behalf of income, resulting in the excess payments by
income. The accounts submitted with this petition and
D
report were duly approved by a decree (May
1932, R. p. 27) and jurisdiction was retained fo
further necessary orders or instructions.
The day following approval by the court of
counts, that is, on May 27th, 1932, one of the life
ficiaries, Paul A. Andrews, died,
only two quarterly payments of $1,000.00
been made to him in accordance with the January
1932, decree. Following his death the trustees
came into court, this time for instructions as to
was legally entitled to the balance of income due ujider
the decree of January 15, 1932—the second wife of
said Paul A. Andrews, as Executrix of his estate, or
his daughter, appellant here, as his only 4 ‘issue’’ un¬
der paragraph ‘‘Sixth” of the will creating the trust.
Paragraph 5 of this petition stated—
“Your petitioners further aver that the (iext
quarterly date of restoration to income and |dis-
tribution of $2,000.00 pursuant to the third para¬
graph of the decree of January 19, 1932, will be
on August 17, 1932, and although your petitioners
will have to borrow an additional amount before
then, they do not know to whom to pay the share
to which the said Paul A. Andrews would have
been entitled, if living.”
Answers to the rule issued on this petition were filed
by the two interested parties, and upon the facts dis¬
closed by the record, the question was orally arghed
and authorities filed. Thereafter the learned tidal
judge filed a memorandum (R. p. 43) to the effect tjhat
the court would enter an order directing the trustees
i
of the estate to pay and distribute the fund in questjion
to appellant, daughter of deceased Paul A. Andrews,
as against the claim of his executrix. Thereafter (he
6
Executrix filed a “Petition for a Rehearing” in which
the only relief prayed was that the court should grant
a new hearing in the matter (R. p. 44). The follow¬
ing March 25th the court filed an opinion wherein,
without acting upon the iietition for rehearing, it re¬
versed its former decision and held in favor of Paul
A. Andrews’ Executrix (R. p. 48). The appeal here
is from the decree entered as a result of the court’s
last opinion.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS.
Appellant here relies upon the following errors com¬
mitted below, to wit:
1. In reversing its decision of January 10th, 1933*
wherein the accumulated interest fund in question was
awarded to appellant and entering the Decree of April
14th, 1933.
2. In acting finally upon Muriel Abbott Andrews’
petition for a rehearing, without affording appellant
any opportunity to be heard thereon, and in entering
a final decree reversing a previous order upon a peti¬
tion which requested a rehearing only.
3. In holding that the will of Frank W. Andrews
authorized and required the Trustees thereunder, by
paragraph 6 thereof, to pay over accrued income to
persons other than the two sons of testator therein
mentioned and their issue.
4. In construing the will of Frank W. Andrews as
an entirety to provide that income accrued during the
life of either of the beneficiaries thereunder, Paul A.
Andrews and Walter S. Andrews, became their prop¬
erty prior to being actually paid over to them, and in
thus holding that the Executrix of the Estate of Paul
I
A. Andrews was entitled to certain income accrued
during his lifetime but not actually paid over to him
or specifically set aside for his benefit, as against the
claim of the issue of said Paul A. Andrews.
ARGUMENT.
i
Pertinent Provisions of the Will.
The will is set forth in extcnso at pages 38-43 ofi the
Record, but for purposes of convenience the provisions
thereof that seem pertinent to the question of construc-
tion presented are set forth below:
Paragraph “Fifth” gives to the testator’s wife for
the period of her life “the use and income of all the
rest and residue” of his estate, directing, howeve
“that said income shall not be alienable by
said wife, nor shall the same be liable for
debts.”
mv
her
Paragraph “Sixth” makes disposition of the estate
after the death of testator’s wife, providing with! re¬
spect to the residuary estate that it should be held in
trust until the death of the survivor of his two sons,
thereafter to their issue. With respect to distribution
of the income, all important here, the testator in this
paragraph directed—
“and my trustees shall dispose of the nett rents
and income of said trust property arising before
the conveyance just directed, as follows: They
shall pay the said nett rents and income during the
continuance of this trust by equal quarter yearly
payments in every year in equal shares to such of
my said two sons as may be living at the time | of
payment and to the lawful issue then living ] of
s
cither of my said two sons who has then deceased
(wheither such my son have died before or after
me) such issue taking’ by representation accord¬
ing to the stocks the share which such mv deceased
son would have taken if living.
“I have given no part of my said residuary es¬
tate free of trust to my children, for the reason
that It hey will be amply provided for from the
fund coming to them under the will of my father,
William T. Andrews.” (Italics supplied)
Paragraph “Tenth" is significant when considered
along with the quoted portion of “Sixth”—
“I direct that the income herein bequeathed
shall not be alienable bv anv benefieiarv either bv
assignment or bv anv other method and the said
income shall not be subject to be taken by his or
her creditors by any process whatever”,
as is Paragraph “ Thirteenth ”—
“The decision of my trustees as to any question
arising between capital and income shall be final
and binding on all persons then or thereafter inter¬
ested.”
APPLICABLE RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.
Appellant has been unable to find but one case near
enough in point of fact to that involved here as to be
useful as a controlling authority; but the absence of
such cases is the rule rather than the exception in con¬
struction suits. The solution of the question presented
is not difficult, however, when the established rules of
construction are applied to the facts disclosed by this
record. The first of these rules, that the intention of
the testator—which is to be “gathered from the four
9
corners of the will itself ”—must be the governing fac¬
tor, hardly needs more than mention—
“The cardinal rule of testamentary construe-
*
tion, as already intimated, is that the plain intent
of the testator as evinced by the language o£ his
will must prevail. * * * Courts have spokeju of
such intention as the ‘law’, the ‘pole star’ orj the
‘soverign guide’ when referring to this governing
principle of testamentary causes.” Schouler on
Wills, 6th Ed., Vol. II, page 967, Sec. 855.
Testator’s dominant purpose to keep his mojiey,
capital and income, in the hands of his wife, his ^ons
and their issue, as against claims or demands of ^ny
other persons, is evident from every portion of jthe
will where it might reasonably have been exhibited.
The income shall not be alienable by the wife during
her lifetime, nor liable for her debts; at her dentil,
when the sons take, the power to alienate “by assign¬
ment or bv anv other method” is affirmatively with-
m/ m/ f
held as to them and successive beneficiaries, and jtlie
income is guarded against seizure by creditors “by any
process whatever”. Investments are limited to ileal
i
estate, and in order to make these restrictive provi¬
sions regarding alienation of income more effective,
the trustees are given absolute discretion to determine
questions between capital and income—otherwise,
questions of vesting, equitable conversion and the like
might give outsiders a foothold. All of these provi¬
sions of the will, contained in separate paragraphs,
when taken and considered in connection with the lan¬
guage of paragraph “Sixth” that the income shall be
paid quarterly to such of testator’s sons as are living
at the time of payment and to the lawful issue then
living of either son then deceased, lead irresistibly to
10
the conclusion that the testator’s gift to his wife, his
sons and their issue was of actual as opposed to theo¬
retical income, and give to the words of paragraph
“Sixth” a clear and unambiguous meaning. Unpaid
accumulations of income upon the death of a bene-
ficiarv 2:0 to his issue; all but testator’s own descen-
dants are barred from its enjoyment.
Paragraph “Tenth” is that—
“the income herein bequeathed shall not be alien¬
able bv any beneficiary either bv assignment or
bv anv other method and the said income shall not
» *
be subject to be taken bv his or her creditors bv
any process whatever.”
This provision is not only consistent with the theory
that he intended the sons to have onlv such income as
was paid over to them by the trustees and not accumu¬
lations, but dovetails with that theory. What happens
if this accumulated income is given to the executor of
the deceased son’s estate, as is urged on the other side ?
It is alienated by will, and it thus becomes “subject to
be taken” bv that son’s creditors for debts contracted
by him during his lifetime in derogation of the rights
of the testator’s grandchild, a thing absolutely for¬
bidden by paragraph “Tenth”. The court cannot con- 1 .
sistently give effect to paragraph “Tenth” of this will
and at the same time reject appellant’s contentions!
X 01 * should it be overlooked, in thus taking the will
“by its four corners” that the testator provided the
income was to be paid only in “equal quarter yearly
payments”—a thing impossible in a trust limited to
investments in real estate unless aided by powers such
as are given the trustees in paragraph “Thirteenth”
to determine questions between capital and income.
11
The testator and his scrivener must have realize^ that
it would be impossible to pay out from assets composed
entirely of real estate holdings income calculated upon
a theoretical bookkeeping basis 4 4 in equal quarter
yearly payments”. Theoretical income which flight
accrue upon the books could not be paid out 44 in lequal
quarter yearly payments,” and would be subject to
attachment bv creditors were it absolutely “vested”;
but when subject to the trustees’ determination under
paragraph 44 Thirteenth” and the provision of 44 Sjxth”
that it should not belong to any particular beneficiary
until actually paid over to him, the scheme to confine
payments of accumulated income absolutely to the sons
and their issue appears complete.
The rule just discussed is referred to as the 44 car¬
dinal rule of construction.” But there is a seconcj. one
intimately related to the first and just as firmly estab¬
lished in our law—that courts in construing wills jnust
give the words used therein their full and naiural
meaning. Rule XVI of Mr. Jarman’s famous twenty-
four rules of construction is—
44 That words, in general, are to be taken in their
ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a clear in-
tention to use them in another can be collected,
and that other can be ascertained; and they are,
in all cases, to receive a construction which jwill
give to every expression some effect, rather than
one that will render any of the expressions inoper¬
ative. * * *” 2 Jarman on Wills, (6th Am. hjld.).
Or, as Schouler puts it—
4 4 It is the intention of the testator as expressed
in his own will which governs; and this paramount
intention must be discerned through the word^ of
i
the will itself, as applied to the subject-matter and
the surrounding circumstances. In other words,
the plain and unambiguous words of the will must
prevail and cannot be controlled or qualified by
any conjectural or doubtful construction growing
out of the situation, circumstances or conditions
ol* the testator, his property or the natural objects
of his bountv.
%
“The real inquiry is not what the testator in¬
tended! to express but what the words used do ex¬
press.” Sehoider, 6th Ed., Vol. II, pp. 975-6, Sec.
859.
“V'ljien the language of a will is plain no judi¬
cial construction should be indulged in, and con¬
struction cannot go so far as to make or amend a
will.” \ Schmdcr, Vol. 2, Sec. 838, p. 642.
“Words in general, whether technical or popu¬
lar. are to be taken in their plain and usual sense,
unless a clear intention to use them in another
sense can be collected and that sense ascertained
besides. All things being equal, the natural and
literal import of words and phrases is presumed
to have been intended; and each word is to have
its effect, if the general intent be not thwarted
thereby.” Sell older, Vol. 2, Sec. 865, p. 984.
The following are a few other statements of this
rule—
“It is the dutv of the court to ascertain the in-
tentioii of the testator from the words he has used
and to ascertain and give effect to the legal conse¬
quences of that intention when ascertained. * * *
In construing a will the words and expressions
used are to be construed in their ordinary, proper
and grammatical sense.” Thompson, Wills, Sec.
157, p. 136.
“In construing a will effect should be given to
every word and clause if not inconsistent with the
13
general intent of the whole will when taken to¬
gether. It is presumed that every word is in¬
tended bv the testator to have some meaning, and
no word or clause in the will is to be rejected to
which a reasonable effect can be given.” 28 R. C.
L., Sec. 176, p. 217.
i i
In the case of Wright v. Denn, 23 U. S. (10 Wheat.)
204, 239, Mr. Justice Story remarked that—
“It is our duty to give effect to all the words of
a will, if, by the rules of law, it can be done. And
where words occur in a will their plain and ordi¬
nary sense is to be attached to them, unless the
testator manifestly applies them in some other
sense.”
i
Upon authority of this same rule this court refused
to construe the words “wife or child or children” to
mean wife and child or children” although the lan¬
guage used seemed to defeat a dominant purpose of the
testator. And this decision was upheld upon appeal
to the Supreme Court of the United States. Travers
v. Reinhard, 25 D. C. App. 567; 205 U. S. 423. Cfther
decisions by this court in which the rule is referred to
and applied are—
DeVauglm r. DeVauglm, 3 App. D. C. 53;
Cruit v. Owen, 25 App. D. C. 514;
Mayo v. Whedon, 47 App. D. C. 138.
In the Cruit v. Owen case, supra, the court in referring
to this rule of construction said—
“In construing a will the whole will must: be
read together, and each term employed giveij its
full natural meaning; and no words of the tejsta-
14
tor should bo rejected or refused their sensible
meaning: in the place where employed, unless it be
required to make sense for the context of the
will.”
And in Mayo r. Whcdoii, supra —
“It is tlie dutv of the court to give to words of
a will their full natural meaning.”
The particular words of this will which appellant
urges should be given their full, natural, grammatical
effect are that the trustees in respect to income—
“shall pay * * * the net income * * " to such of my
said two sons as may he liriny at the time of pay¬
ment and to the lawful issue then living of either
of mv said two sons who has then deceased.”
(Italics supplied)
If the rule of construction thus laid down bv the text
*
writers, stated by the Supreme Court of the United
States and manv times announced bv this honorable
* *
tribunal is to be given effect here, what meaning is to
be ascribed to these words of the testator? It is clear
to anyone! who reads the English language, it would
seem, that the trustees are limited in respect to any
payments of accumulated income to such of the sons
as may bej living at the time of payment. The adverb
“then” is first used to modify the verb “living” and
in the second instance to modify “deceased”; in each
case the word clearly relates back to the prepositional
phrase “at the time of payment,” making the time
when the monev is paid into a living beneficiarv’s
hands thei test as to the right to receive it. The test
is clear and simple: Who in direct line of descent
from the testator is living to receive and receipt for,
15
inter vivos, the particular income accumulation. And
thus the income, as well as the principal, is kept
strictly within the family, according to the testator’s
clear intent.
As heretofore said, this dovetails with the provision
of paragraph “Tenth” and any other construction
would necessarily do violence to the intendment
thereof.
Suppose for argument that Paul A. Andrews had
died intestate with appellant, his daughter, as hi>j only
heir at law. And that after the death of her parent
but before any income was paid over to her she had
died. How would a claim of her creditors asserted
through a personal representative as against the rights
of her issue, be resolved? Is there anv doubt but that
. * i
actual payment not having been made to her in her
lifetime, nothing would pass under her will or by op¬
eration of law in the event of intestacy; and tha|t the
directions of the will would act upon the accumulated
fund and pass it on to her issue? That case is pre-
ciselv the same as the one presented here.
THE CASE OF LOMBARD V. WITBECK.
The case nearest to the instant one in point of fact,
so far as counsel have been able to find, is tliajt of
Lombard v. Wit beck (1898), reported in 173 Ill. 396;
51 X. E. 61. There the testator bequeathed his prop¬
erty to trustees, with direction, after the usual state¬
ment of the trusts, that they should— j
“hold said last named residue estate for the use
and benefit of the last named three grandchildren
during their lifetime, the net income therefrom to
be divided into three equal parts, one part to be
paid to each of said last named grandchildren from
16
time to time, as my said trustees and their survi¬
vors in trust shall in their judgment deem for the
best interests of said grandchildren.”
By a succeeding paragraph it was provided that—
4i I further provide and direct that in case of the
death of either of my said three grandchildren,
Frank M. Wit beck, Gertrude 11. Witbeck and
Henry J. Witbeck, leaving issue or descendants
of issue them surviving and born in laful wed¬
lock, the one-third share of all of mv estate left
for said last named three grandchildren shall de-
cend to such issue or descendants of issue of each
child so deceased, such issue and descendants of
issue to take per stirpes and not per capita; and
in case anv one or more of said last named three
grandchildren shall die without leaving anv such
issue or descendants of issue, then said one-third
share of mv said residue estate shall go to the sur-
vivor or survivors of said last named three grand¬
children. ”
By still another paragraph the trustees were given
authoritv, in their discretion, to make advancements to
the life beneficiaries out of the personal estate, and
further, that should any grandchild become intemper¬
ate or otherwise incompetent to manage his or her es¬
tate to—
44 withhold any or all of said income from such
grandchild and to add the same to the principal
sum from which said income was derived, and to
withhold such income for such period of time as
my said trustees and their successors in trust
shall,'in their discretion, deem for the best interest
of such grandchild.”
The estate, which was a large one, was probated in
Cook County, Illinois.
17
The trustees divided the net income into three} parts
je part
order
bene-
ments
book-
tander
tment
and credited in an “Income Trust Account” on!
to each grandchild. This account was kept in
that the trustees might distribute income to the|
ficiaries as and when they decided to make pay
under the provisions of the will. It appeared that
credits to this account were not intended by them as
the equivalent of distributions, but were simply a
keeping convenience. They kept another account
the name of each beneficiarv denominated “Inves
Trust Account” and to this was credited that portion
of the income trust account not paid over to tl}e life
beneficiaries. “This was done so that that whicth ac¬
crued might be held subject to a subsequent division.”
One of testator's said grandchildren died leaving no
issue and a dispute arose between the administrator of
sucli deceased grandchild and the other life beneficia¬
ries of the estate as to who was entitled to a siJm of
$20,375 credited to the decedent in the “Injcome
Trust Account.” The contention was made by the
administrator, just as in the instant case, that tin
ting apart and earmarking of this money vested
thereto in the deceased beneficiary so as to pass
his administrator. In its opinion, the court held
this accrued or accumulated income, despite the
that it was credited on the books to the deceased
passed to tlie surviving heirs rather than to thef ad
ministrator, saying:
“The fact that the trustees had not actually
turned this fund back into the principal estat
they were authorized to do by clause 20 of the
but kept it separate as a matter of convenience in
bookkeeping, did not amount to a transfer of it to
the individual estate of Henry J. Witbeck.”
set-
title
it to
that
fact
heir,
as
kvill.
18
As hereinbefore stated, this case is the closest in
point of fact to the instant one counsel has been able to
find; and it is submitted to the Court as being a strong
authority!in support of appellant’s contentions. But
appellantts chief reliance is the settled rules of con¬
struction as applied to the particular language of this
will rather than case precedent.
The Decree of January 19, 1932, Did Not Vest Any In¬
terest in the Fund in the Then Life Beneficiaries
But Only Provided for Payment to the “Life Bene¬
ficiaries Entitled Thereto” “When” the Amount
Was Restored to Income.
The parties to the Decree of January 19th, 1932, and
the learned judge who signed that decree (not the
tjttnae one who ruled upon the question here presented)
must have foreseen that should either of the then bene¬
ficiaries die any portion of the fund undistributed
would pass under the trust to the issue of such de¬
ceased; for that decree after authorizing the trustees
to reimburse and restore to the income account the
amount in question, went on to provide:
“TT7/c^ the said amount is restored to income”
it should be distributed *7o the life tenant* en¬
titled thereto , in quarterly installments.” (Italics
supplied)
At the time the decree complained of was signed the
record showed (K. p. 31, paragraph 5) that only a small
portion of the fund had been restored, and that the
trustees would have to borrow monev for restoration
purposes before any further quarterly installment
could be made. It was theoretical or book income, in
no form to be “then” paid over. In this connection
19
the learned trial justice was in error as to the true fact,
| 7
for he thought, when he prepared his final opinion, that
the income item had been “fully restored” (R. p. 49).
And this error of fact mav have been the foundation
*
of his decision. j
If the fund in question by the Decree of January
19th, 1932, vested so as to become the property of
Paul A. Andrews, his creditors could have come in and
attached the same for his debts; and that would i[nani-
festly be a situation the testator had in mind avoijding.
ANY DOUBT IN THE MINDS OF THE COURT
SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF AP¬
PELLANT.
Appellant is a granddaughter of the testator, Frank
W. Andrews, and as the sole issue of her father, Paul
A. Andrews, is opposed to an executrix of his estate.
It can be assumed that some portion at least of this
fund if it is turned over to the executrix will be ^ised
for debts—a thing enjoined by paragraph “Tenth”
of the will—and thus testator’s “issue” are arrived
in effect against his son’s “debtors.” In Sliermom v.
American Security & Trust Company, 57 D. C. 273 ? the
rule, generally applicable elsewhere, that doubtful will
construction questions should be resolved in favor of
the testator’s kindred, was applied to this jurisdiction.
We see no good reason why, if any doubt exists ais to
a proper construction 1o be given in the instant c^ase,
appellant should not invoke and the court apply this
rule.
20
CONCLUSION.
It is submitted that the plain meaning of the lan¬
guage of paragraph “Sixth” in question here and the
only meaning consistent with the general intent and
purpose of the testator as gathered from the other por¬
tions of the will, is that the sons should be entitled to
income onlv when it was paid to them, and that anv
unpaid accumulations should pass to their issue; that
thev were to receive only actual income to them in hand
•
paid; and hence it follows that the fund involved be¬
longs to appellant.
Respectfully submitted,
Frost, Myers & Towers,
i Attorneys for Appellant.
WALTER
KOPER,
aiEF 0$ BEHABF OF AFPELUffi
ANDREWS, EXECUTRIX ITOD -3
PAUL A; ANDREWS, DECEASED
Executrix uptaer the
A. Andr&vdfDeceased.
Attorney
Andr\
: of Pa
PRESS OF JUDD <fc DETWEILEB, INC., WASHINGTON
I
{Jonrt of J^tals, jjistriri 4 ^Jolpte.
No. 6025
MARGARET ANDREWS BELMONT, Appellant,
WALTER S. ANDREWS, REGINALD S. HUIDE-
KOPER, MORGAN BELMONT, Trustees, eIt. au
BRIEF ON BEHALF OF APPELLEE, MURIEL ABBOTT
ANDREWS, EXECUTRIX UNDER THE ^TILL OF
PAUL A. ANDREWS, DECEASED.
Statement.
The will of Frank W. Andrews was admitted to probate
by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia on July
8, 1903.
By his said will the testator gave, devised and be¬
queathed to his wife, for and during the term of hej natural
life, the use and income of all the rest and residue of his
estate, real and personal, subject to the requirement on her
part to the payment out of said income of all taxes Assessed
against any of the real estate, the interest on any, and all
debts secured by liens thereon, the cost of maintaining
lv
9
proper insurance upon the improvements thereon, and the
expense of keeping said improvements in a good state of re¬
pair (Rec. 39-40).
At the death of his wife, which occurred on November 22,
1914, the testator gave, devised and bequeathed all of the
said rest, residue and remainder of his estate, except a few
family articles, in trust during the lives of his two sons,
Paul A. Andrews and Walter S. Andrews, and during the
life of the survivor of them; and directs that during the
continuance of the trust the trustees shall dispose of and
pay in every year the net rents and income of the trust prop¬
erty by quarter yearly payments in equal shares to such
of his said two sons as may be living at the time of pay¬
ment and to the lawful issue then living of either of his
said two sons who has then deceased (Rec. 40-41).
The trust involved in this case became active on Decem¬
ber 1, 1914, at i which time the corpus of the trust estate
consisted of five pieces of improved real estate in the Dis¬
trict of Columbia (Rec. 20).
By the will the trustees are authorized and empowered,
in their discretion, to sell at public auction or at private
sale, or to lease any portion or the whole of the corpus of
the trust estate; but in case of any such sale or sales the
testator further directs that the reinvestment of the pro¬
ceeds thereof shall be in other productive real estate (Rec.
41). Because of this provision of the will the trustees
have been unable to create a capital cash fund with which
to meet capital obligations, such as payment of curtails
and extensions of loans, capital betterments and charges,
and by reason thereof, during the period from December
1, 1914, to December 31, 1931, such obligations have fre¬
quently been paid out of the net income of said trust prop¬
erty with the consent of Paul A. Andrews and Walter S.
Andrews, the beneficiaries entitled during said period to
the net income from the trust estate (Rec. 22-23).
3
Because of existing and maturing capital obligations, the
trustees filed the original petition in this cause praying
for authority and power to encumber by mortgage or deed
of trust any pieces or parcels of the real estate owned by
tlie trust estate, in order to provide funds to m^et matur¬
ing encumbrances, charges and taxes when they fall due,
or to provide for the continuation or renewal of existing
encumbrance or encumbrances on any part of jsaid real
estate (Rec. 2-15).
Thereafter, on January 19, 1932, the Court entered its de¬
cree upon said petition. By paragraph III thereof, said
decree provides as follows: |
“It appearing from the evidence that tli^ sum of
Thirty-two Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-two Dol¬
lars and Six Cents ($32,982.06) was taken from the in¬
come of the estate and used for capital expenditures,
the Trustees are hereby authorized and directed to
reimburse and restore to income said amount and to
make the necessary adjustment and charge^ against
capital in their accounts to lie hereafter submitted to
the Court, and when the said amount is restored to
income, to distribute the same to the life tenants, en¬
titled thereto, in quarterly installments of Oijie Thou¬
sand Dollars ($1,000) to each beneficiary;” (|Iec. 17).
At the date of the passage of said decree both of|the said
sons of the testator were living; but thereafter, jon May
27, 1932, Paul A. Andrews died, leaving a last will and
testament which was duly admitted to probate anc|l record
on September 15, 1932, by the Probate Court, in land for
the County of Suffolk, State of Massachusetts, in which
he appoints his widow, the appellee herein, as the execu¬
trix thereunder, and to whom he gives, devises and be¬
queaths his residuary estate (Rec. 35). j
Prior to his death the trustees paid to Paul A. Andrews
two quarterly payments of $1,000 each in accordance with
2v
4
said decree of January 19, 1932, leaving a balance of $14,-
491.03 of one-half of the sum of $32,982.00 which the Court
found had been taken bv the trustees from the net income
of the trust property prior to said decree and used for
capital expenditures.
On August 15, 1932, the trustees tiled herein their sup¬
plemental petition in which they allege that this appellee,
upon her qualification as executrix of the estate of Paul A.
Andrews, deceased, will claim (and subsequently claimed)
that the said unpaid balance of $14,491.03 was, pursuant
to said decree of January 19, 1932, distributable to her as
such executrix; that the appellant herein claimed that
under said will of Frank W. Andrews, deceased, and said
decree of January 19, 1932, the said sum was distributable
to her, she being the onlv child of Paul A. Andrews, de-
ceased; that “they did not know to whom to pay the share
to which the said Paul A. Andrews would have been en¬
titled, if living,” and prayed for the Court’s directions
and instructions with respect thereto (Rec. 31).
Thereafter, on April 14, 1933, the Court entered its fur¬
ther decree herein, in and by which it finds that upon the
death of the said Paul A. Andrews the unpaid balance of
$14,491.03 of said net income passed to, became vested in
and payable to his estate in the same manner and at the
times as directed bv said decree of Januarv 19, 1932, and
directs the trustees to make payment thereof in accordance
therewith. From this decree the present appeal is being
prosecuted.
ARGUMENT.
I.
As to the Will of Frank W. Andrews.
We have no controversy with counsel for appellant re¬
specting the settled rules of construction of wills as an-
I
nounced in the decisions of our courts and by t(pxt writers
on the subject of wills.
Except as to sub-paragraph B of paragraph Sixth of the
will showing the source from which the two sons of the tes¬
tator derived title to and became vested with t|ie various
sums, aggregating the sum of $32,982.06, of t|ie annual
accrued net income from the trust property tal^en by the
trustees, with the consent of the two beneficiaries, and used
for capital expenditures, we are not concerned with said
will, or with the other paragraphs thereof referred to in
appellant *s brief.
The decision on the question herein involved jis neither
dependent upon nor requires a construction by the court
of the will of Frank W. Andrews, deceased. Whatever con¬
struction is necessary or required as to the decision of this
question, is as to the decree of January 19, 1932, Which de¬
termined and fixed the rights and interest of the parties,
including the appellant herein, with respect to said sum.
Considering, however, the question solely from the stand¬
point of the will and aside from the decree of January
19, 1932, we respectfully submit, the court below did not
err in decreeing that the unpaid balance of one-half of
the various sums of the annual net income, aggregating
the sum of $32,982.06, taken by the trustees, with the con¬
sent of Paul A. Andrews, the beneficiary entitled thereto,
and used for capital expenditures or obligations, vras the
property of Paul A. Andrew’s, and at his death passed to,
became vested in and payable to his estate.
By said sub-paragraph B of paragraph Sixth of said
will the testator directs that his trustees:
‘ 4 shall dispose of the net rents and income of said trust
property arising before the conveyance just directed, as
follows: They shall pay the said net rents and income
during the continuance of this trust by equal | quarter
yearly payments in every year in equal shares to such
of my said two sons as may be living at the time of pay¬
ment, etc.-’
This language of the will is clear and definite and needs
no construction. It expressly directs and requires that the
trustees shall dispose of the net rents and income of said
trust property in every year , by equal quarter yearly pay¬
ments to testator’s two sons, if living at the time such quar¬
ter yearly payments become payable. There is no power
contained in the will, discretionary or otherwise, giving to
the trustees the right to withhold or to accumulate any por¬
tion of said annual net rents and income of the trust prop¬
erty, or to divert, use or dispose of it, or any part thereof,
in any manner except by equal quarter yearly payments
in every year U> his said two sons, if living at the time such
payments become due and payable.
The record in this case, including the reports of the trus¬
tees filed herein with their petitions, shows that prior to the
decree of January 19, 1932, there had been taken by the
trustees from the net annual accrued income, to which the
two sons were entitled in every year, various sums, aggre¬
gating the sum of $32,982.06 at the date of said decree, and
used for capital expenses, and that the said various sums so
taken and used by the trustees were, at the time of the tak¬
ing, from the net annual income which had accrued in vari¬
ous years prior thereto, and which said income the trustees
were directed and required to pay to testator’s said two
sons who were living at the end of each vear of its accrual.
The trustees being without power or authority under the
will to dispose of the annual net income from the trust
property except as therein directed, they could not, there¬
fore, take or use the same or any part thereof for capital
expenditures or obligations save with the consent of the
beneficiaries then entitled thereto, and this they obtained.
By obtaining such consent from the said two sons of the
testator, the trustees thereby recognized that t^ie various
sums aggregating the sum of $32,982.06, so taken and used,
was from the accrued annual net income and tli|at the tes¬
tator's said two sons were entitled thereto. Unless tes¬
tator’s said two sons had been vested with and entitled to
have paid over to them as their property suc|h accrued
annual net income at the time or times when thelsame was
i
so taken and used by the trustees, then the obtaining of
their consent to said taking for such use would have been
an unnecessary and useless thing.
Since the trustees were expressly directed and required
by the will to pay in every year the annual net income from
the trust property to the said two sons of the testator liv¬
ing at the time fixed by the will for each quarter yearly
payment thereof, we respectfully submit that in 'this case,
under the familiar maxims, ‘‘equity regards that as done
which ought to be done” and “equity regards ihtent and
substance rather than form,” equity will regard the quarter
yearly payments in every year as having been made by the
trustees to testator’s two sons at the times when jthe same
should have been made to them in accordance witjli the di¬
rections in the will, and will treat said two sons of the
testator as vested with the same interest and eiititled to
the same rights as if the payment of said incom|e by the
trustees had actuallv been made; that such income became
their absolute property, freed from the trust, at the times
when the same should have been paid; and that tl^e taking
and use of said income by the trustees, with the consent
of testator’s said two sons, was in effect a loan or advance
by them to the trustees for the purposes of tjie trust
J I
estate. |
The provision of said sub-paragraph of said \|ill with
respect to the quarter yearly payments of income j“to the
8
lawful issue then living of either of mv said two sons who
has then deceased” refers to and could onlv refer to such
*
quarter yearly payments accruing and payable after and
in the year of the death of either of said sons, since the
said sub-paragraph expressly directs the payment of the
net rents and income in every year, and the will does not
clothe the trustees with power and authority to withhold
or to accumulate the income or any part thereof, or to
dispose of it otherwise than by payments in every year of
its accrual to the beneficiaries entitled thereto at the times
fixed for such payments. In this connection and because
of the lack of such power of the trustees in this case to
withhold or to accumulate or otherwise to dispose of the
income from the trust property, or any part thereof, we
respectfully submit that the case of Lombard v. Witbeck,
173 Ill. 396, has no bearing on or application to the facts
in this case. In that case the trustees were expressly
clothed with discretionary power and authority with re¬
spect to the disposition of the income from the trust es¬
tate. They were authorized to pay such part of the income
to each of the beneficiaries as the trustees in their judg¬
ment should deem for the best interest of such beneficiary;
and they were also authorized, in their discretion, to with¬
hold anv or all of the share of the income and add the
%
same to the principal from which the same was derived,
of any beneficiary who should become intemperate or other¬
wise incompetent to manage his or her estate.
II.
Paragraphs Tenth and Thirteenth of the Will.
The Tenth paragraph directs that the income shall not be
alienable bv anv beneficiary either bv assignment or other
method, and shall not be subject to be taken by creditors by
any process whatever.
9
It is perfectly obvious that this paragraph of t,}ie will has
no application to this case, since there was no alienation or
attempted alienation by assignment or otherwise) by either
of the testator’s sons, or a taking or an attempted taking
by creditors of either of them by any process whatever,
prior to the accrual and the vesting in said two sfms of the
various sums of income, aggregating $32,982.06; and there
are no restrictions on the life beneficiaries, or either of
them, with respect to the use and disposition of income pay¬
able to them after the same was paid over to them).
The Thirteenth paragraph makes the decision of the
trustees as to any question arising between capital and in¬
come final and binding on all persons then and thereafter
interested.
As to the fund herein involved, there is no occasion for
a decision by the trustees as between capital anq income.
If there was ever any necessity therefor, then the) trustees
themselves, as shown by the record, ascertained ajid deter¬
mined that the said sum of $32,982.06 was income jfrom the
trust property. Paragraph III of the decree of |January
19, 1932, likewise determined that said sum was ta^en from
income, and directed the restoration thereof to income.
III. j
I
The Decree of January 19, 1932. j
The hereinbefore quoted paragraph III of the final decree
of January 19, 1932, on the original petition filecj by the
trustees in this cause, in clear and definite langua|ge fixed
and determined the rights and interests of the j various
parties thereto, including the appellant in this ca^e, with
respect to the said sum of $32,982.06, of which a balance of
$14,491.03 of one-half thereof is herein involved. It con¬
stitutes an adjudication by the court of an indebtedjness by
the trustees to the then living life tenants, Paul A. Ajndrews
10
and Walter S. Andrews, growing out of the taking by the
trustees, with the consent of said life tenants, of accrued
income theretofore coming into their hands, belonging to
and payable to said life tenants, and used by said trustees
for capital expenditures in connection with the administra¬
tion of the trust property.
Said paragraph III of said decree determined that the
aforesaid sum of $32,9S2.00 was taken from the accrued in¬
come of the trust estate in prior years and used for capital
expenditures, and authorized and directed the trustees to
restore the same to income. Again applying the familiar
maxim that “equity regards that as done which ought to
be done”, then equity will treat its direction to restore said
sum to income as having been done at the date of said
decree.
When said sum is restored to income, said paragraph
further directs the trustees to distribute the same to the
life tenants entitled thereto. Who were they? There can
be no question, we respectfully submit, that the life ten¬
ants referred to bv the court were the two sons of the tes-
%>
tat or, who were vested with and entitled to have paid to
them bv the trustees the various sums of accrued net income
from the trust property, aggregating said sum of $32,982.06,
taken by the trustees, with their consent, and used for
capital expenditures.
That said paragraph of the decree further directs said
restored sum to be distributed in quarterly installments of
$1,000 to each beneficiary, does not lessen or change the de¬
termined and fixed rights and interests of testator’s said
two sons in and to said sum so directed to be restored. The
manner of such distribution was due to the fact, as the rec¬
ord shows, that the trustees were not in a position to make
immediate payment thereof in one sum because of lack of
funds and being under the necessitv of borrowing monev.
11
Conclusion.
In conclusion we submit:
1. Because of the fact that the will makes no pro¬
vision FOR A FUND OUT OF WHICH TO MEET CAPITAL EXPENDI¬
TURES, THE CONSENT OF THE LIFE BENEFICIARIES TO TpE USE BY
THE TRUSTEES OF INCOME THEN DUE AND PAYABLE [TO THEM
UNDER THE TERMS OF SAID SUB-PARAGRAPH B OF PARAGRAPH
Sixth of the will to meet necessary capital expenditures,
CONSTITUTED NOTHING MORE NOR LESS THAN A LOAN BY SUCH
I
LIFE BENEFICIARIES TO THE TRUSTEES TO MEET THE EXIGENCIES
OF THE SITUATION.
I
2. That the decree appealed from established a debt
due the life beneficiaries amounting to $32,982.06 arising
FROM THE LOAN BY THEM OF THAT AMOUNT TO THE TRUSTEES
FROM INCOME DUE AND PAYABLE TO THEM, ONE-HALF OF SUCH
DEBT BEING PAYABLE TO EACH OF SAID BENEFICIARIES.
3. That the balance of said debt adjudicated }n favor
of said Paul A. Andrews, one of said beneficiaries, viz.,
$14,491.03, CONSTITUTES AN ASSET OF HIS ESTATE AND PASSED
TO THIS APPELLEE, MURIEL ABBOTT ANDREWS, IN ACCORDANCE
WITH HIS WILL, AND IS PAYABLE TO HER AS THE EXECUTRIX
THEREUNDER.
In view of the foregoing we submit that the decree of
the court below appealed from should be by this Court
affirmed.
Benjamin S. Minor,
H. Prescott Gatley,
Arthur P. Drury,
Attorneys for Appellee , Muriel Abbott
Andrews , Executrix under the Will
of Paul A. Andrews , Deceased.
( 4385 )